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Unresolved ethnic conflicts threaten the stability and the very ex-
istence of multi-ethnic states. Ethnically divided states have 
struggled to build structural safeguards against such disputes into 
their political and legal systems, but these safeguards have not 
been able to prevent all conflict. Accordingly, multi-ethnic states 
facing persistent ethnic conflicts need to develop effective dispute 
resolution systems for resolving those conflicts. This presents an 
important question: what kinds of processes and institutions might 
enable ethnic groups to resolve their conflicts with each other and 
the state? This Article explores that question, reviewing the inter-
disciplinary literature on ethnic conflicts, the legal literature on 
legal process and conflict resolution, and a case study of ethnic 
conflicts and conflict resolution in Ethiopia. At crucial moments 
in the development of an ethnic conflict, legal processes such as 
mediation, arbitration or constitutional interpretation might play 
a role in resolving the dispute. But ethnic conflict resolution insti-
tutions and processes must be carefully designed to take account 
of the variety, complexity and dynamics of ethnic conflicts, and to 
address the substantial number of ethnic groups and interests that 
diverge from the “minority rights” legal model. Ultimately, the 
Ethiopian example calls on us to consider whether and how legal 
processes might be able to ameliorate the threat posed by ethnic 
conflict.  
I. Introduction 
A. The Persistent Problem of Ethnic Conflict 
The front page of today’s newspaper is a maelstrom of ethnic con-
flict.1 Unchecked, such conflicts can escalate into genocidal campaigns 
                                                                                                                      
 1. The first and most fundamental problem in talking about ethnic conflict is defining 
ethnicity. This is a task that is well beyond the scope of this Article. Fortunately, for purposes 
of this discussion, it is enough to rely on a community’s self-identification as a single ethnicity 
in designating it an “ethnic group,” and likewise enough to rely on its self-identification of its 
dispute with another group as an “ethnic conflict” to designate that conflict as “ethnic” as 
well. Because the concern of this Article is resolving conflicts that arise between peoples who 
perceive themselves as identifying with a particular ethnicity and who perceive these conflicts 
as being ethnic in nature, it is these perceptions that matter, and not whether the perceptions 
are appropriate by an objective standard. Accordingly, I will refer to “ethnic conflict” 
throughout the Article to describe conflicts that the parties involved consider ethnic, and to 
“ethnic groups” to describe communities that consider themselves to be of a single ethnicity. 
The problem of defining ethnic identity is also addressed in the discussion of the Silte conflict, 
see infra II.A.3. See generally Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (rev. ed. 1991); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in 
Conflict (1985) [hereinafter Ethnic Groups in Conflict]; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The Ethnic 
Question: Conflicts, Development, and Human Rights 1–3 (1990); Miriam J. Aukerman, 
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of violence and threaten the very existence of the state. The problem is 
especially acute in developing and newly democratic states with nascent 
formal institutions and legal traditions. In such states, kinship relation-
ships often define the social structure; social, economic and political 
power are likewise held and exercised on a kinship and ethnic basis; and 
government by the formal state has infiltrated only weakly, if at all, into 
local power institutions.2  
Around the world, multi-ethnic states are struggling to devise struc-
tural safeguards within their governments to forestall ethnic disputes. 
Many of the newly democratic and developing states that have reformed 
their political systems in recent years have sought to diffuse ethnic 
power by creating non-ethnic institutions.3 Others have developed com-
plex, expressly ethnic power-sharing arrangements, designated seats in 
their legislatures for ethnic groups, and made other efforts to create self 
enforcing incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation.4 A number of states 
have established protections for the rights of ethnic minority or indige-
nous groups.5 Constitutions have often been the vehicle for these efforts.  
But none of these state structures, whether or not ethnically neutral, 
can be expected to create an ideal political balance capable of nullifying 
the risk of ethnic conflict. Rather, even well designed political systems 
have been challenged by the tenacity of ethnic identification and the cer-
tainty of resultant ethnic conflict. So long as a society is ethnically 
defined and controlled, many conflicts, whether over resources, political 
representation, or mere individual disputes, will be perceived and organ-
ized as ethnic conflicts.  
                                                                                                                      
Definitions and Justifications: Minority and Indigenous Rights in a Central/East European 
Context, 22 Hum. Rts. Q. 1011 (2000).  
 2. In the Ivory Coast, for example, Ivoirians reportedly view themselves primarily as 
“members of regional extended-family and corporate kin groups competing with others for 
their share of scarce economic resources and political clout,” rather than as members of the 
Ivorian polity. Jeanne Maddox Toungara, Ethnicity and Political Crisis in Côte D’Ivoire, 12 J. 
Democracy, July 2001, at 63, 64. Political turmoil has rocked the country as politicians have 
called upon ethnic loyalties and repressed other ethnic groups in their bids for power. See id.  
 3. For instance, Bulgaria has attempted to eliminate ethnicity from its politics by out-
lawing ethnic political parties and permitting only ethnically neutral political organizations. A 
more drastic mechanism for attempting to take the ethnic dynamic out of play in politics is to 
divide a multi-ethnic state into several primarily single-ethnicity states, as the former Czecho-
slovakia did. See Jon Elster et al., Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: 
Rebuilding the Ship at Sea 254–59 (1998).  
 4. See Will Kymlicka, Federalism and Secession: At Home and Abroad, 13 Canadian 
J. L. & Jurisprudence 207 (2000). The UN-supported attempt to use traditional Afghan institu-
tions and to acknowledge and incorporate ethnic groups and power structures in constructing a 
new Afghan government is an example of an expressly ethnic and highly controversial ap-
proach. See, e.g., Loya Jirga, Guardian Unlimited website (June 14, 2002), at http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/comment/story/0,11447,730745,00.html.  
 5. See, e.g., S. Afr. Const. arts. 31, 211–12. 
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Therefore, although establishing non-ethnic political structures to 
counterbalance ethnic power may be wise, an expectation that political 
actors will then necessarily behave in an ethnically neutral fashion is 
simply counterfactual. In good faith or bad, political actors will act in 
accordance with the underlying ethnic power structure to achieve their 
ends.6 Likewise, an expressly ethnic power-sharing arrangement may be 
the necessary foundation for construction of a multi-ethnic state, but 
such arrangements cannot be expected consistently to reflect the actual 
balance of power, either in any individual dispute, or in general as ethnic 
allegiances and circumstances shift over the long-term.7 Establishing 
self-enforcing internal incentives for cooperation between ethnic groups 
is crucial to long-term stability, but inevitably some quarrels will arise 
that will not prove responsive to these incentives.8 And while guarantee-
ing rights to ethnic minorities or indigenous groups may be effective in 
states dominated by a single majority group or in which a civic identity 
predominates, such guarantees are unlikely to provide a basis for distin-
guishing between competing claims where ethnic identity and conflicts 
are not limited to certain determinate groups but are ubiquitous.9  
This is not to say that such efforts are futile. To the contrary, devis-
ing a political system that will provide incentives for positive 
participation in politics by ethnic groups and balance ethnic interests is 
crucial to promoting inter-ethnic stability. But it is not enough. Multi-
ethnic states facing persistent ethnic conflicts need to develop effective 
                                                                                                                      
 6. For example, in spite of Bulgaria’s rule prohibiting ethnic political parties, its Turk 
minority is represented by an ethnically defined party, the Movement for Rights and Free-
doms, illustrating the resilience of ethnic identification and the failure of fiat to effectively 
eliminate it from the political realm. Similarly, although Czechoslovakia divided into the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia in an effort to create single ethnicity states, it could not as a 
practical matter eliminate all ethnic diversity and therefore could not eliminate all ethnic con-
flict either. There remains a Hungarian minority in Slovakia, which complains of repression 
based on ethnicity, such as instances of Hungarians being dismissed from government posi-
tions. See Elster, supra note 3, at 254–59.  
 7. Of course, there are some longstanding federations that explicitly recognize and 
distribute power according to ethnicity: Belgium and Switzerland are obvious examples. But 
these states nonetheless face continued ethnic divisions: Belgium’s 2003 elections revealed 
sharp political differences between Flemings and Walloons and rising electoral support for a 
pro-independence Flemish candidate. See A Model for Europe?, The Economist, May 24, 
2003, at 53. In addition, Belgium and Switzerland have far less complex ethnic divisions than 
many of those states, and their political, economic and social conditions differ substantially as 
well, making it difficult to graft their formal structures into more complex ethnic, political and 
socio-economic contexts. See id.; Elster, supra note 3, at 253–54; Jack Snyder & Karen 
Ballentine, Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas, in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict 61, 
61–63 (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 2001). 
 8. See Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in 
a Divided Society 154 (1991) [hereinafter A Democratic South Africa].  
 9. See Toungara, supra note 2, at 65. In this context, it is impossible to provide special 
“minority” guarantees because almost everyone is by definition a member of a non-majority 
ethnic group. 
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systems for coping with those conflicts. This is where legal processes 
and institutions could be of some use. Ethnic conflict has most often 
been treated as a political, rather than a legal, problem. But in relying on 
political solutions, states have failed to exploit the potential of legal 
processes to resolve conflicts at an early stage, before they become en-
trenched. 
At crucial moments in the development of a conflict, opportunities 
arise to alleviate tensions and prevent the disagreement from escalat-
ing.10 Structural solutions like those described above are aimed at the 
first such moment: they address potential catalysts of conflict in ad-
vance, in an effort to prevent conflicts from arising at all. Governments 
have also recognized and acted upon a second crucial moment: the mo-
ment at which a conflict becomes contentious enough, and therefore 
dangerous enough, to pose a crisis meriting political attention. At this 
point, states rely on ad hoc political responses, such as negotiation by 
government leaders or intervention by security forces, to push conflicts 
to an end lest they destabilize the state.  
But there is an intermediate moment in the development of ethnic 
conflicts that has thus far largely been overlooked: the moment when a 
conflict has arisen but has not yet become a crisis. This is the point at 
which the law traditionally has played a role in resolving disagreements 
of other kinds, by providing the parties with legal processes as a credible 
alternative to self-help for resolving their disputes. By acting on this in-
termediate moment in ethnic conflicts, legal processes could play a role 
in resolving these disputes as well.  
B. Considering Legal Process Solutions 
Thus far, the law and legal scholarship addressing ethnicity have fo-
cused primarily on defining the substance of the system of rights and 
political representation a multi-ethnic state should grant its ethnic 
groups, if any.11 This is a necessary and important concern. However, 
there is another important issue that deserves exploration. Setting aside 
the question of how ethnic rights and roles should be defined, what kinds 
of legal processes might enable ethnic groups to resolve their conflicts 
with each other and the state? 
I begin with the idea that legal processes could serve as a useful tool 
in ethnic dispute resolution, either directly or by serving as a model for 
                                                                                                                      
 10. See Susan L. Carpenter & W.L.D. Kennedy, Managing Public Disputes 11–17 
(1988). 
 11. See, e.g., James W. Nickel, Group Agency and Group Rights, in Ethnicity and 
Group Rights 235 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997); Surya P. Subedi, Constitutional 
Accommodation of Ethnicity and National Identity, in Accommodating National Identity: New 
Approaches in International Law (Stephen Tierney ed., 2000).  
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dispute resolution strategies.12 We presume the inevitability of private 
disputes and the importance of courts to resolve them. Indeed, conflict 
resolution experts urge parties to long-term contracts to anticipate a se-
ries of disagreements in the course of the contract and to agree in 
advance upon appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms, in addition to 
using the ordinary courts.13 But thus far, we have not made a practice of 
presuming the inevitability of ethnic disputes and agreeing in advance on 
appropriate dispute resolution systems for them.  
The one context in which legal processes have been used regularly 
to address ethnic concerns is that of minority and indigenous rights. Spe-
cifically, the current legal framework in many states forbids 
discrimination against minority and indigenous groups and carves out 
some sphere of protected rights for such groups.14 This is of course an 
important task: majority-minority contexts have been the setting for hor-
rific and intractable abuses that demand legal responses. My purpose is 
not to critique the established framework of minority and indigenous 
rights within a majority-minority setting. 
But while this framework serves a vital purpose, it does not address 
the substantial number of ethnic interests and disputes that diverge from 
this model. In some multi-ethnic states, there is no majority group, and 
all ethnic groups could be considered minority or indigenous, rendering 
those categories irrelevant.15 Ethnic conflicts arise amongst all sorts of 
ethnic groups, in all sorts of contexts. If conflict does not limit itself to 
minority and indigenous groups, legal structures for conflict resolution 
cannot do so either. Because our current approaches fail to capture the 
actual variety and complexity of ethnic interrelationships in multi-ethnic 
                                                                                                                      
 12. While traditional models usually defined legal process by reference to an impartial 
judge or formal rules of procedure, new legal process theories often take a broader view, char-
acterizing a process as “legal” by virtue of its function in shaping and implementing law as 
well. Similarly, changes in practice, such as the growth of alternative dispute resolution, have 
expanded the working conception of legal process. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. In na-
tional and international contexts, legal processes such as litigation, mediation and arbitration 
have succeeded in drawing social and political actors into orderly dispute resolution and pur-
poseful group decision-making. See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, New International 
Legal Process, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 334 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Proc-
ess, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181 (1996).  
 13. See Stephen Goldberg et al., Designing an Effective Dispute Resolution System, in 
Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation and Other Processes 307, 307 (Stephen B. Gold-
berg et al. eds., 4th ed. 2003). 
 14. See generally Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights (Hurst Hannum ed., 
1993). 
 15. In Nepal, for example, there are roughly 60 ethnic groups and no majority group. 
Scholars have struggled to make use of the “minority” and “indigenous” categories to define 
ethnic rights in this setting, and some have proposed defining minority groups as those that are 
non-dominant rather than focusing on numbers. See Surya P. Subedi, Constitutional Accom-
modation of Ethnicity and National Identity, in Accommodating National Identity: New 
Approaches in International and Domestic Law 151, 153–54 (Stephen Tierney ed., 2000).  
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states, they do not supply the analytic tools to address the conflicts that 
arise from those relationships.  
This Article focuses on the possibility of developing processes for 
these other, overlooked conflicts and groups. This concern is most urgent 
in “ethnic-identified states” like those described above. In such states, 
people identify primarily with members of their ethnic group, and only 
secondarily, if at all, with the state. Social communities, public issues, 
and private life are also defined by ethnicity, and accordingly, social, 
public, and private disputes all tend to be defined by ethnicity as well.16 
In this context, ethnic disputes are all but inevitable, and when they arise 
they can threaten the very foundations of the state. 
Part II of this Article identifies certain well founded but counterin-
tuitive realities of ethnic conflict in ethnic-identified states: the 
complexity of ethnic disputes, the catalytic role of democracy and civil 
liberties, and the failures of ostensibly ethnically neutral systems. Not 
only are these realities counterintuitive (at least from the perspective of 
the American approach to race relations), they are also unappealing, in 
that they make the process of conflict resolution both complicated and 
difficult. However, these qualities are well established in the interdisci-
plinary legal and political science literature exploring the dynamics of 
ethnic relations in ethnic-identified states. To illustrate these qualities, I 
develop a case study of three recent ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia. 
In Part III, I consider whether legal processes have any role to play 
in responding to these realities. To address this question, I turn to theo-
ries of conflict resolution, legal process, and constitutional 
interpretation, and return again to the Ethiopian examples introduced 
above. Ethiopia employs elements of a legal process based, ethnic con-
flict resolution system within the context of a far more sweeping 
political approach to accommodating ethnic interests. Preoccupied with 
                                                                                                                      
 16. In contrast, in civic-identified states, there is a strong national identity or popular 
culture that competes with and counterbalances ethnic identities, and so disputes are also more 
likely to be understood in non-ethnic terms. It is not that there are no ethnic identities in civic-
identified states, but that those identities do not dominate the national identity. Not so in eth-
nic-identified states, where ethnicity is hegemonic and competes only with other ethnicities 
and not with a common, non-ethnic popular or political culture. As a result, ethnic relations in 
ethnic-identified states differ fundamentally from, for example, the American experience. 
Many individuals in the United States do of course identify closely with their racial and ethnic 
groups. Without seeking to minimize the extent or significance of these identifications, we can 
acknowledge that it is rare in the United States for all aspects of a community’s life to be de-
fined and governed by ethnicity, and that there is also a vibrant popular and political culture 
that competes with ethnicity even within relatively insular ethnic communities. Indeed, the 
closest correlation that can be drawn between American experiences with ethnicity and those 
in ethnic-identified states is to the most insular and self-governing American ethnic groups: 
certain Native American and Native Alaskan communities, for example. For a discussion of a 
range of studies showing distinct differences in the existence and strength of overarching 
identities, see Ethnic Groups in Conflict, supra note 1, at 6–7, 18–19.  
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the political framework, those scholars who have considered the Ethio-
pian system have not focused on its dispute resolution elements.17  
There are three distinctive characteristics to the Ethiopian ethnic 
conflict resolution system: it establishes a permanent, ethnic-composed 
institution that grants standing to ethnic groups; it uses both consensual 
and adjudicative processes; and it gives a fundamental role to constitu-
tional interpretation. These qualities call our attention to essential 
questions about the role of legal processes in addressing ethnic conflicts: 
Should states ever give official recognition to ethnic affiliations? If so, 
how can legal processes be shaped to respond to ethnic concerns? Could 
constitutional interpretation be used to resolve ethnic conflicts at a na-
tional level?  
Finally, in Part IV, I propose issues for further consideration. The 
successes and failures of the Ethiopian system raise five fundamental 
concerns for the use of legal process in addressing ethnic conflict: 
(1) providing some measure of legal process for ethnic groups; (2) pro-
moting participation and toleration through constituency building; 
(3) developing principles for constitutional interpretation; (4) establish-
ing safeguards against misuse; and (5) designing institutions. 
This Article is a beginning, not an end. It addresses foundational is-
sues, analyzing the gaps in the current legal framework for ethnic 
relations and identifying some factors in ethnic conflicts and legal proc-
esses that might tend to promote successful resolution of the one by the 
other. It proposes ideas that merit further exploration. Fundamentally, it 
is an attempt to look at ethnic conflict in a new way, through a legal 
process lens. 
II. Three Realities of Ethnic Conflict 
There are three well founded but counterintuitive realities of ethnic 
conflict in ethnic-identified states that tend to foil efforts at conflict pre-
vention: the complex and dynamic nature of ethnic conflict, the catalytic 
role of democracy in ethnic conflict, and ethnically neutral policies as a 
mask for ethnic inequalities.18 To illustrate these ideas, I will make use 
                                                                                                                      
 17. See Alemante G. Selassie, Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa, 28 
Yale J. Int’l L. 51 (2003); Paul B. Henze, A Political Success Story, 9 J. Democracy, Oct. 
1998, at 40; Richard Joseph, Oldspeak vs. Newspeak, 9 J. Democracy, Oct. 1998, at 55; John 
w. Harbeson, An Authoritarian, Bureaucratic Regime, 9 J. Democracy, Oct. 1998, at 62.  
 18. This Section summarizes three vast subjects of political science research in only a 
few pages, and so this is of necessity a highly truncated account of the literature on the sub-
ject. Accordingly, I have tried to offer here an uncontroversial account of well-established 
research focusing specifically on ethnic conflict in severely divided societies. However, this 
brief introduction does not allude to internal debates within the literature except as they bear 
directly on the point in question.  
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of the facts of three ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia, involving the Berta, the 
Silte, and the Oromo peoples. These examples represent a range of eth-
nic conflicts and interrelationships. They also express certain distinctive 
qualities of ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic, ethnic-identified setting. 
Ethiopia is a particularly good subject for study of complex ethnic 
conflict that does not fit the majority-minority model, because it is ex-
tremely ethnically divided. It has no majority ethnic group, over eighty 
formally recognized ethnic groups (“Nationalities”),19 and over two hun-
dred smaller ethnic communities within those Nationalities.20 Ethiopia 
has experienced centuries of ethnic conflict and conquest, and ethnic 
divisions defined the opposition groups in the country’s seventeen year 
civil war, which brought the current government into power.21  
Ethiopia shares certain political and historical commonalities with 
many other ethnic-identified states struggling with ethnic conflict. 
Ethiopia is a post-communist state with a new constitution and young, 
weak political and legal institutions; it is a developing state with limited 
economic resources to implement its conflict resolution program; and it 
                                                                                                                      
 19. In Ethiopia, ethnic groups that have been formally recognized as such by the gov-
ernment are called “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples.” See Eth. Const. art. 39. As this is 
rather unwieldy, I shall shorten the term to “Nationalities” throughout this Article. In Ethio-
pian sources, an Ethiopian ethnic group that perceives of itself as an independent ethnic group 
but that has not been formally recognized as such by the government is variously referred as a 
“Nation,” a “Nationality,” a “People,” or a “community.” In order to distinguish formally 
recognized from unrecognized groups, I shall use the term “community” to refer to ethnic 
groups that are as yet unrecognized. 
 20. See FDRE Parliament website, at http://www.ethiopar.net/English/basinfo/ 
Basicifo.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). 
 21. For at least a thousand years, the recurrent pattern of Ethiopian history has been for 
one ethnic group to conquer neighboring tribes and expand the scope of unified Ethiopian 
territory, followed by a period of division and reconsolidation of territory, followed by 
expansion again. In the last centuries of the Ethiopian Empire, the Amhara people were 
ascendant, and this history has not been forgotten by the other Ethiopian Nationalities. In 
1974, Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed in a military coup and replaced by a communist 
military government known as the Derg. For the next 17 years, the country was torn apart by 
armed struggle between several ethnically defined, communist, opposition armies and the 
government, as the civil war that had begun in Eritrea during Haile Selassie’s regime spread to 
the neighboring region of Tigray and then to the rest of the country. See Harold G. Marcus, A 
History of Ethiopia 185–93 (1994); Embassy of Ethiopia website, History, at http:// 
www.ethiopianembassy.org/history.shtml. The opposition armies’ conflict with the Derg was 
based both on nationalist claims to independence and on intra-communist ideological 
differences. See Tekeste Negash & Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War: Making Sense of the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian War 16–17 (2000). The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (“EPRDF”) was a late in the game coalition of the TPLF with smaller and weaker 
Amhara and Oromo opposition groups at the very end of the civil war, in order to create a 
multi-ethnic imperative for the new government. See Harbeson, supra note 17, at 65. When 
the long-standing Oromo opposition group and military organization, the Oromo Liberation 
Front, refused to join forces with the TPLF, the TPLF fostered a new, pro-EPRDF Oromo 
party so as to have Oromo representatives in the new EPRDF ranks. See id. The current 
Ethiopian government, which is made up almost entirely of EPRDF members, describes the 
EPRDF as a “unified force of Ethiopian people.” See Embassy of Ethiopia website, supra.  
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lacks a strong civic identity.22 Where differences exist with other  
multi-ethnic states, they tend to make Ethiopia’s situation more extreme, 
more precarious, and therefore less likely to survive serious ethnic 
conflicts.23  
Ethiopia has tried to manage its conflicts by implementing political 
policies that have proved both innovative and controversial. These will 
be discussed in Section III. For now, it is enough to know that Ethiopia’s 
ethnic groups are engaged in an open competition for social, economic, 
and political power. Their disputes lay bare the dynamics of ethnic dis-
putes generally. 
A. Three Ethnic Conflicts 
The Berta Nationality believed that it had been shortchanged. Even 
though it had a population greater than that of the Gumuz Nationality—
117,000 Berta as compared to 105,000 Gumuz—it had only 28 represen-
tatives on the Benshangul-Gumuz regional state council, while the 
Gumuz had 35.24 This disparity mattered. The other Nationalities in the 
                                                                                                                      
 22. The ERPDF army defeated the Derg communist government and took power in 
1991. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 217. After four years of rule by a transitional government, 
the current constitution and federal structure entered into effect in 1995. See Constitution of 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1/1995 (Aug. 21, 1995) (Con-
stitution ratified Dec. 12, 1994 and entered into effect on the date of this proclamation) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Constitution Proclamation]. The federal and regional govern-
ments have been gradually structuring their institutions and becoming active since that time. 
Of the institutions particularly relevant to this Article, legislation was passed defining the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts in 1996, while legislation defining the procedures by which 
the House of the Federation and the Council of Constitutional Inquiry’s should carry out their 
constitutionally mandated tasks passed only in 2001. See Federal Courts Proclamation No. 
25/1996, in Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2d Year, 
No. 13 (Addis Ababa—Feb. 15, 1996) (on file with author); Consolidation of the House of the 
Federation and Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities Proclamation No. 251/2001, art. 
46(1), in Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 7th Year, 
No. 41 (Addis Ababa—July 6, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter HOF Proclamation]; 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation No. 250/2001, in Federal Negarit Gazeta of 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 7th Year, No. 41 (Addis Ababa—July 6, 2001) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter CCI Proclamation]. 
In terms of per capita income, Ethiopia is “the poorest country on earth,” with per capita 
income of less than $100 per day. For comparison, the average per capita income for “low-
income countries” was $140 and the average for sub-Saharan Africa was $500. With a Human 
Development Index of .309, Ethiopia ranks 171st out of 174 countries on this scale (based on 
1998 data). See The Ethiopian Economic Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research 
Institute, Second Annual Report on the Ethiopian Economy, vol. II 2000/2001, at 1–2 (pre-
pared by Befekadu Degefe et al.) (based on World Bank 1999 data. The latest data available 
for any sector of the economy according to this report was 1999/2000) [hereinafter Second 
Annual Report].  
 23. For example, Ethiopia’s poverty is extreme, even by comparison to other develop-
ing states. See generally Second Annual Report, supra note 22.  
 24. On the surface, this was a classic redistricting problem. The number of representa-
tives allocated to each Nationality was determined according to the number of woredas (the 
local administrative districts) that each occupied. Although the Berta were more numerous 
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region (the Shinasha, the Mao and the Como) accounted for less than 
12,000 people, so the Berta had almost exactly half the population of the 
region.25 They wanted half the representatives as well. The Berta repre-
sentatives demanded a rebalancing of the representation from the 
regional state council. The council refused. The Berta walked out, and 
the regional government’s business ground to a halt.26  
The Silte community is part of the Gurage Nationality.27 They live in 
the State of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (“Southern Na-
tions regional state”), the most ethnically diverse region in the country.28 
They are an agricultural community who grow ensete and grains. They 
are a Muslim community. They live in the Shoa area and speak the East 
Gurage language.29 And at least some in the Silte community want to be 
recognized as their own Nationality, separate from the Gurage National-
ity, separate from the other Gurage communities.30 But who could decide 
such a question? The Silte petitioned the Southern Nations regional state 
                                                                                                                      
than the Gumuz, they occupied only nine woredas to the Gumuz’s thirteen. See Interview with 
Ato Musetefa Haj Adew, Member of Committee of Revenue Administration, and Ato Zekarias 
Megiso, Chair of Committee on States Affairs, House of the Federation Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
(June 13, 2002) (on file with author) (interviewees speaking in their personal capacities) 
[hereinafter Adew/Megiso Interview]. Since the woredas were initially drawn, populations had 
shifted, but representation had not. See Interview with Ato Zekarias Megiso, Chair of Com-
mittee on States Affairs, House of the Federation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Dec. 10, 2002) (on 
file with author) (interviewee speaking in his personal capacity) [hereinafter Megiso Inter-
view]. 
 25. The Mao and the Como have about 4,000 people and the Shinasha have about 
3,200. There is also a special district, the Pawe Special District, which is entitled to represen-
tation. See Adew/Megiso Interview, supra note 24; Joint Agreement between the Benshangul 
Gumuz State Executive Committee and Representatives of the Berta Nationality (Alexandria 
Translations, trans., June 15, 2001) (original and translation on file with author) [hereinafter 
Berta Agreement]. However, as discussed below, the population issue turned out to be more 
complicated than it at first appeared.  
 26. See Interview with Ato Samuel Alemayahu, Head of Secretariat, Council of Consti-
tutional Inquiry, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (June 6, 2002) (on file with author) (interviewee 
speaking in his personal capacity) [hereinafter Alemayahu June 6, 2002 Interview]; Megiso 
Interview, supra note 24. 
 27. See Donald N. Levine, Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of A Multiethnic Society 
app. § VI(A) (2d ed. 2000).  
 28. See Letter from Almaz Meko, Speaker of the House of Federation to the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry, No. 0/8K10/31 (Zenebe Adelahu trans., Jan. 17, 1992) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter House of the Federation Referral Letter, Silte case]; Memo from House of 
Federation to Council of Constitutional Inquiry re: Request for Constitutional Interpretation 
and Opinion (Zenebe Adelahu trans., Jan. 16, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Request 
for Constitutional Interpretation, Silte case]. As the name implies, this region is made up of 
many Nationalities, without a substantial majority of any particular Nationality. This is in 
contrast to most of the regions, which generally have a substantial majority of one Nationality, 
after which the region is named. Thus the region of Tigray is dominated by the Tigreans, the 
Somali region by the Somali Nationality, and so on.  
 29. See Levine, supra note 27, app. § VI(A). 
 30. See House of the Federation Referral Letter, Silte case, supra note 28; Request for 
Constitutional Interpretation, Silte case, supra note 28. 
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government, and it petitioned the federal government in its turn to take 
on the matter instead. But the federal government refused to decide as 
well, sending the matter back to the regional state.31 This game of hot 
potato went on and on, as the petition was passed back and forth from 
the capital, to the region, and back yet again. In the meantime, the Silte 
waited, and five years went by.32 
The Oromo Nationality is the largest in Ethiopia, representing 
roughly 40% of the population, as compared to the Amhara’s 25% and 
the Tigrean’s 10%.33 It has its own regional state, Oromia, in which most 
of the people of Oromo Nationality live, and within which the Oromo 
comprises a majority of the population.34 But the Oromo Liberation 
Front (the “OLF”) walked out of Ethiopia’s post-communist transitional 
government only a year after it was formed, and the OLF played no role 
in drafting the current federal constitution.35 There is now sporadic vio-
lence between the OLF and the government.36 Although the Oromo 
                                                                                                                      
 31. See Request for Constitutional Interpretation, Silte case, supra note 28. Appropri-
ately, a fairly literal translation of the House’s letter referring the matter to the Council 
describes the question as having “stayed long turning around” between the federal and re-
gional governments. See House of the Federation Referral Letter, Silte case, supra note 28.  
 32. See Request for Constitutional Interpretation, Silte case, supra note 28.  
 33. The remaining 25% is composed of roughly 80 small ethnic groups. There are a 
few other relatively large players, such as the Afar and Somali people, but most of the groups 
are tiny even by comparison to the Tigreans, much less to the Oromo.  
 34. See FDRE Parliament website, supra note 20 (“According to the 1994 census re-
sult, the major ethnic groups within the State [of Oromia] include 85% Oromo, 9.1% Amhara 
and 1.3% Gurage (some of Sebatbet Guragie, Sodo Gurage and Siltie). The remaining 4.6% 
constitute other ethnic groups.”) Based on the 1994 census numbering the total population of 
Oromia as 18,732,525, the total Oromo population in Oromia should be nearly 16 million. 
According to the same census, Oromo also comprise roughly 19% of the population in the 
independently administered federal and Oromia capital of Addis Ababa, roughly half of the 
population in the other two cities with the status of separately administered regional states or 
federal districts, 6% of the tiny state of Gambela, and 3% or less of the population in the re-
maining states. Id. While these figures do not account for the number of Oromo in the diverse 
Southern Nations regional state nor for the considerable movements of peoples into Addis 
Ababa since 1994, taking them as a rough guide they indicate that nearly 1.1 million Oromo 
live outside of the administration of the Oromia regional state (considering Addis Ababa to be 
outside its administration), as compared to the nearly 16 million who live within it. Oromia is 
by far the largest state geographically, comprising roughly 32% of Ethiopia’s land. Id. 
 35. See Kifle Wodajo, The Making of the Ethiopian Constitution 132 (on file with au-
thor) (Kifle Wodajo was the chair of the Constitutional Drafting Commission and this text is 
based on personal knowledge). The OLF also boycotted the 1992 elections, and it has no rep-
resentatives in the House of People’s Representatives, the lower, legislative house of the 
federal Parliament. See Harbeson, supra note 17, at 67; House of the People’s Representatives 
website, Party Affiliation of Members of The House of Peoples’ Representatives Archive 1999–
2000, at http://www.ethiopar.net/English/archive/2000/hoprep/party.html.  
 36. See, e.g., Two Killed, Four Injured in Student Disturbances, Ethiopian Rep., Apr. 3, 
2002, at http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/eng_newspaper/Htm/No291/r291new4.htm (on file 
with author) (reporting the shooting of Oromo students by “security forces” during a student 
demonstration concerning fertilizer prices, agriculture taxes and insufficient use of the Oromo 
language. “The President of Oromia blamed the Oromo Liberation Front” and “denied that 
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appear to have power in terms of number, territory, and even political 
recognition through the Oromia regional state, many Oromo continue to 
feel disenfranchised and disempowered.37 There are calls for an inde-
pendent state of Oromia, but no official action toward this goal.38 Rather, 
the Oromo’s concerns remain in the realm of political protest and politi-
cal violence, never emerging into political process.39 
The Berta, the Silte, and the Oromo are living examples of the three 
realities discussed in the introduction. But they demonstrate something 
more. Not only is ethnic conflict too complex for a one time solution, 
but there are distinctive qualities to ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic, eth-
nic-identified setting. Democracy and civil liberties serve as sparks for 
ethnic conflict, especially inasmuch as young, weak democracies pro-
vide a context in which conflict can spread quickly into national 
catastrophe. And not only is ethnic neutrality often merely a mask for 
ethnic divisions, but ordinary, ethnically neutral judicial institutions are 
rarely organized to resolve ethnic disputes. 
B. The First Reality: Complex and Dynamic Conflicts 
These three conflicts illustrate the multifarious and pervasive nature 
of ethnic interaction, and thus of ethnic conflict, in ethnic-identified 
multi-ethnic states. In scholarly writings on this subject, there seem to be 
as many different explanations of ethnic conflict as there are conflicts 
themselves.40 Ethnic conflict is based in ancient and deeply rooted 
                                                                                                                      
these demands had originated from the masses of people and students.”); see also Henze, 
supra note 17, at 46–47. 
 37. See generally Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquir-
ies (P.T.W. Baxter et al. eds., 1996); Harbeson, supra note 17, at 65–67. 
 38. See, e.g., Mohammed Hassen, The Development of Oromo Nationalism, in Being 
and Becoming Oromo, supra note 37, at 67, 77–80; P.T.W. Baxter et al., Introduction, in Be-
ing and Becoming Oromo, supra note 37, at 9.  
 39. The Oromo have submitted other claims, such as a border dispute with Somalia, to 
the House of Federation for determination. However, to my knowledge, their central claim to 
self-determination has not been considered by the House of the Federation or any other insti-
tution. Nor do the Oromo tend to participate in the House of the Federation process readily. 
Rather, the Somalia dispute was only submitted after efforts at direct settlement were utterly 
stymied. See Megiso Interview, supra note 24. 
 40. Apart from theories of nationalism, there are also a variety of factors that commen-
tators identify as being indicators of a multi-ethnic state’s stability. Stability is associated with 
multiple layers of cultural difference (such as language, religion, and so on), cutting across 
each other rather than layering directly upon and reinforcing one another. See Joseph Eliot 
Magnet, National Minorities and the Multinational State, 26 Queen’s L. J. 397, 419 (2001) 
(relying on Lijphart’s classic study, Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Com-
parative Exploration (1977)); Ethnic Groups in Conflict, supra note 1, at 19–21 (citing the 
“more complex pattern of group loyalties” in ethnically divided Western societies as a reason 
ethnic conflict is less intense there than in ethnically divided African and Asian societies). In 
Ethiopia, each ethnic group tends to have its own language, reinforcing division. Religion is a 
point of coalition between some ethnic groups but an additional line of division between oth-
ers: the population is roughly equally divided between Ethiopian Orthodox Christians and 
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hatreds that rise phoenix-like from the ashes whenever not brutally 
repressed by a strong-fisted regime.41 A nationalist drive for an 
ethnically defined state, innate in the heart of every person, is the cause 
and/or the expression of ethnic conflict.42 Or perhaps ethnic conflict is 
merely a convenient guise for a modern phenomenon. Rather than 
expressing an inevitable drive toward self-definition and self-
determination whose effect on a state is determined more by the number 
of nationalities it contains or by those nationalities’ willingness to assert 
those claims, ethnic conflict expresses a modern identity struggle that 
develops in the face of industrialization and other social tensions.43 
Alternatively, perhaps ethnic conflict is merely one highly visible 
expression of conflict over tangible benefits and resources that are 
channeled through ethnically defined structures.44  
No one of these theories seems to explain the source of every ethnic 
conflict. Indeed, there seem to be as many nationalisms at work in multi-
ethnic states as nationalities. In Benshangul-Gumuz, the Berta and the 
                                                                                                                      
Muslims, with smaller minorities of other Christian sects and local beliefs. See FDRE Parlia-
ment website, supra note 20; Levine, supra note 27, app. § VI(A). Magnet also cites Lijphart 
for the following stability indicators: “a tradition of elite accommodation; the willingness of 
present elites to cooperate; the presence of overarching loyalties; a diffusion of power among 
several communities, rather than between two principal contenders; the overall size of the 
polity; and the presence of more than two political parties.” Magnet, supra, at 419.  
 41. This theory, however evocative, does not provide an explanation of why some an-
cient hatreds die out altogether, nor what immediate precipitant spurs the resurgence of a long-
dormant feud. Nor are all ethnic conflicts of ancient origin. See Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 
supra note 1, at 98–99. 
 42. See, e.g., Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 55 (1983) (“It is nationalism 
which engenders nations, and not the other way around.”).  
 43. According to this theory, the familiar face of ethnic relationships, families and 
enemies, stands in for the otherwise anonymous and inexplicable sufferings and injustices of 
modern life. See Gellner, supra note 42; Elster, supra note 3, at 253–54. Another commentator 
has suggested that Quebec nationalism in Canada has been driven by Québécois’ very success 
in modernizing. As the Quebec middle class grew it developed greater aspirations “to blossom 
and fulfill not only their traditional cultural identity but also their economic identity through 
greater provincial control of their economic affairs.” Ronald L. Watts, Federalism and Diver-
sity in Canada, in Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic 
States 35 (Yash Ghai ed., 2000) [hereinafter Autonomy and Ethnicity]. In a similar vein, it is 
interesting to note that the Eritrean sense of nationalism apparently grew out of the modern 
experience of Italian occupation and Eritrea’s corresponding economic development, which 
created a cultural separation between Eritrea and Tigray. See Negash & Tronvoll, supra note 
21.  
 44. See Magnet, supra note 40, at 431 (“[N]ationalism is rational. It is an instrumental 
adaptation to events that occur when communities are in competition.”). Ethiopia is still in the 
early throes of industrialization, with only a small urban population enjoying modern techno-
logical conveniences. See FDRE Parliament website, General Info (sic), supra note 20. Other 
theorists contend that while ethnic conflict can arise over resource disputes, there is not a one-
to-one relationship between economic and ethnic interests. See Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 
supra note 1, at 134–35; see also Magnet, supra note 40, at 432–36 (summarizing theories 
that attribute nationalism to cultural and linguistic developments in the transition to the mod-
ern industrialized state). 
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Gumuz have never been friends, and their current conflict wallows in a 
longstanding mutual distrust that could certainly be characterized as an 
“ancient hatred” sprung to life.45 On the other hand, their relationship 
seems to have evolved more as an unending squabble over the meager 
resources of the region than as a grand nationalist enterprise for ethnic 
domination.46 The Oromo, in contrast, were themselves the ruling 
peoples of their day, but that day was over 500 years ago.47 Like other 
once-upon-a-time imperialists, they seem to hearken back to the days of 
their empire with some sense of nostalgic fondness and to view their 
current subjugation not just as an injustice, but as an insulting reversal of 
fortune, a matter of pride.48 As for the Silte, they have long lived as one 
of the many loosely related Gurage tribes.49 Whatever their substantive 
differences or similarities with their Gurage cousins, perhaps they would 
have been forever satisfied to identify themselves as one branch of this 
far-flung clan had not modern political reality made it suddenly 
advantageous for them to claim an independent identity.50  
Not only is it difficult to discern a root cause for any particular eth-
nic conflict, but these situations also illustrate that conflicts rarely 
concern purely ethnic interests. Rather, ethnic interests tend to become 
inextricably intertwined with other concerns. In these cases, both the 
                                                                                                                      
 45. See Megiso Interview, supra note 24. 
 46. The Benshangul-Gumuz region is one of the most impoverished and least devel-
oped in Ethiopia. See Second Annual Report, supra note 22; see also Tsega Endalew, Conflict 
Resolution Through Cultural Tolerance: An Analysis of the Michu Institution in Metekkel 
Region, Ethiopia, 25 Soc. Sci. Res. Rep. Series 2–3 (Organization for Social Science Research 
in Eastern and Southern Africa 2002). Endalew describes the Metekkel area, which is one 
zone within Benshangul-Gumuz:  
The Gumuz live in the lowlands with primitive agricultural tools, which forces 
them to experience chronic food shortages. Most of the time they depend on 
hunting and fishing to supplement the wild berries, roots and the like that they 
collect from the bushes . . . Another important characteristic of the region is the 
absence of a  
well-defined infrastructure . . . Even the most important towns are not joined 
together with roads mainly in the western part . . . There are no telecommunication 
and electricity services. 
Id. 
 47. See Jan Hultin, Perceiving Oromo: ‘Galla’ in the Great Narrative of Ethiopia, in 
Being and Becoming Oromo, supra note 37, at 81, 84–89. 
 48. See id.  
 49. See Levine, supra note 27, app. § VI(A). 
 50. Because so many resources are distributed by the Ethiopian state or by NGOs rather 
than being locally created, political recognition is all-important to gaining a piece of the re-
source pie. Officially recognized Nationalities have the right to self-government and thus to 
allocations from the regional state. Regional states themselves get a greater allocation from 
the federal government than similarly sized Nationalities do from regional states, so there is 
also an advantage to achieving statehood. See Megiso Interview, supra note 24. In addition, 
Ethiopia is a classic example of a donor economy, using foreign aid as a primary resource for 
public and private development. See Second Annual Report, supra note 22. 
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Berta and the Silte have economic benefits at stake: both will receive 
substantially more government assistance if they can assert their claims. 
If ethnic antagonisms are unresolved, such interrelationships can take on a 
life of their own, fueling further conflicts. It has been suggested, for ex-
ample, that the popular support behind the rise of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan was primarily ethnic rather than religious. Apparently the 
Taliban were primarily Pushtuns and received their support primarily from 
disaffected Pushtuns acting in opposition to the primarily Tajik and Uzbek 
government. Once in power, of course, the Taliban’s fundamentalist 
policies spurred unrest on new levels.51  
As the Taliban example suggests, ethnic affiliation often overlaps 
with other divisive affiliations, such as religion or geography, intensify-
ing and complicating conflicts and their resolution.52 In Mozambique, 
the three broad families of ethnic groups are located in the northern, cen-
tral, and southern regions respectively, and the alignment of these 
geographical and ethnic divisions has tended to reinforce regionalism 
and divisive tendencies.53 It is interesting, therefore, to note that in the 
Silte case, religion unites the Silte to the other Gurage communities 
rather than dividing them: all are predominantly Muslim peoples.54 In 
the Oromo case, religion is a source of tension: the historically dominant 
Amhara and the currently ascendant Tigreans are Ethiopian Orthodox 
Christians, while the Oromo are Muslim. And while many Ethiopian 
Nationalities do live predominantly in one geographical area, geography 
operates against the Oromo’s interest in self-determination, as they are 
the most widely dispersed of all the Ethiopian peoples.55 
That is not to say that ethnic disputes are hopelessly complex. But 
ethnic conflicts do occur in a variety of forms that defy a single arche-
type. First, the familiar dynamic of a dispute between a civic-identified 
majority and an ethnic-identified minority is not necessarily the domi-
nant pattern in multi-ethnic states. Consider the three conflicts discussed 
above. Not one of these disputes is the story of a minority ethnic group 
oppressed by a controlling majority.56 In Benshangul-Gumuz, for exam-
                                                                                                                      
 51. See Michael McFaul, Reconstructing Afghanistan, 13 J. Democracy, Jan. 2002, at 
170, 172 (reviewing and citing Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamental-
ism in Central Asia (2000)). 
 52. Indeed, one of the indicators for stability in multi-ethnic states is the existence of 
affiliations that cut across categories, such as a common religion uniting diverse ethnic 
groups. See supra note 40. 
 53. See Jeremy M. Weinstein, Mozambique: A Fading U.N. Success Story, 13 J. De-
mocracy, Jan. 2002, at 141, 142–43. 
 54. See Levine, supra note 27, app. § VI(A). 
 55. See id.  
 56. In some states, an ethnic minority dominates the majority. See A Democratic South 
Africa, supra note 8, at 86. And in Ethiopia and other highly stratified states, there is no na-
tional majority at all. This is not just a matter of semantics. In the United States and other 
states where consistent majority-minority relationships can be identified, ethnic problems and 
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ple, the Berta are certainly a minority within Ethiopia at large, but so are 
the Gumuz. Within the scope of the conflict itself, the Gumuz are in the 
stronger political position, but the Berta have roughly equal numbers and 
both are major players within their immediate region.57  
The nature of these relationships has important consequences for the 
success of structural solutions. The asymmetrical government structures 
and exceptionalism that can be productive in accommodating a minority 
group within a majority-dominated state will not likely succeed here.58 
Instead, numerous national identities must somehow be accommodated 
within the standard state structure. Ethiopia is extreme in the sheer num-
bers and diversity of its ethnic groups, but many multi-ethnic states share 
this pattern of numerous small and large ethnic groups with complex, 
overlapping interrelationships.59 So whereas a state like Canada that has 
a majority English population and a relatively geographically discrete 
French minority may be able to accommodate its French minority with 
exceptional status for the state of Quebec, Ethiopia and similar states do 
not have this option, for every community would be exceptional. 
The disputes themselves may be over a variety of issues, and not 
only questions of protected minority or indigenous rights to culture, lan-
guage, and so on. In the Berta, Silte, and Oromo cases, the disputes are 
expressed as political claims: representation, recognition, and participa-
tion. This is, to some extent, a reflection of the Ethiopian system’s 
openness to such claims, which will be discussed in Section III. But not 
                                                                                                                      
intra-state nationalist movements are defined as a problem of minority nationalities. But 
where majority-minority definitions do not correspond to the actual power structure, wherever 
it may be, attempts to define and protect minority groups will not be an effective structure for 
resolving ethnic conflict. Of course, the fact that a relationship is not majority-minority does 
not itself inform us whether there is an unequal power dynamic at play. See, e.g., Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict, supra note 1, at 21–36.  
 57. Although the Gumuz had the upper hand in terms of local political representation, it 
turned out that the Berta had a disproportionately high number of representatives on the 
federal level. See Megiso Interview, supra note 24. Similarly, the Silte are one of many small 
communities in the Southern Nations regional state. While the Oromo do not constitute an 
absolute majority in Ethiopia as a whole, they are the largest of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups. 
Majority-minority interactions are only one possible relationship among many in multi-ethnic 
states. 
 58. See generally Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Mi-
nority Rights 12 (1995).  
 59. Mozambique, for example, has two large ethnic groups that comprise 47% and 23% 
of its population respectively, but these two groups are broad categories that are sharply inter-
nally divided into smaller communities. The remaining 30% of Mozambique’s population is 
also divided among numerous small ethnic communities. Nor has the largest group, the 
Macau-Lowme, become ascendant in Mozambique’s politics: its political life is as fragmented 
as its social life. See Weinstein, supra note 53, at 142–43. In Nigeria there are three ethnic 
groups that constitute roughly two-thirds of the population, each dominating one region of the 
country, but the remaining 25% or the population is made up of over 200 and possibly as 
many as 400 ethnicities. See Rotimi N. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in  
Nigeria 3 (2001).  
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all claims come packaged in political or legal terms. Nationalities bicker 
over use of land and other resources, complain of insults and other repu-
tational injuries, and take offense at cultural and religious practices.60 
These are not formally couched claims presented to political leaders, but 
the source of immediate arguments, fights and riots, and long-term re-
sentments.61 
Next, the very definition of ethnicity often becomes the subject of 
dispute, raising difficult questions about who has authority to determine 
a community’s identity and how this can be done.62 Ethnic self-
identification shifts with time and circumstance, as does the significance 
ascribed to that identification; indeed, some communities may identify 
with multiple groups.63 The Oromo are perhaps the least discrete of the 
ethnic groups described above, having expanded to their present 40% of 
the Ethiopian population through progressive and incomplete assimila-
tion of other ethnic groups, complicating their claims to shared interests 
and intentions.64 The Silte conflict is entirely concerned with the ques-
tion of what constitutes a nationality. When the group does not agree on 
how it identifies itself, and especially when that identification changes 
over time, it is not possible to implement enduring structural solutions 
without some means of answering the fundamental questions about eth-
nicity that arise periodically.  
Finally, it must be acknowledged that however problematic and 
shifting ethnic identity may be, it is nonetheless this identity that 
dominates in Ethiopia and other ethnic-identified states. Indeed, civic 
                                                                                                                      
 60. See, e.g., Nita Bhalla, Conflict Worsens Ethiopia’s Food Crisis, BBC News, July 
10, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2120656.stm (on file with author) (reporting that 
long-standing conflicts between Afaris, Issas, Kereyu and Ittus over resources were 
exacerbating the effects of the drought in the Afar region); ICRC and ERCS launch food 
assistance operation in Afar and Somali regions, Addis Trib., Oct. 18, 2002, available at 
http://www.addistribune.com/Archives/2002/10/18-10-02/ICRC.htm (on file with author) 
(drought effects have been “exacerbated by violence and clashes between different ethnic 
group (sic).”); Officials, Police Accused of Human Rights Violations in Sheka Zone Arrested, 
Aug. 20, 2002, at http://www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2002/Aug/20Aug02/Aug20e2.htm (on 
file with author) (reporting complaints to the regional government of “serious violations of 
human and democratic rights by administration officials . . . the police and armed militia, and 
instigations of inter-ethnic clashes by those elements.”).  
 61. See Officials, Police Accused of Human Rights Violations in Sheka Zone Arrested, 
supra note 60. 
 62. Self-definition is a fundamental but not absolutely determinative approach, particu-
larly as there may be differing opinions within the group and among other interested parties. 
See Jerome Wilson, Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination, 11 Conn. J. Int’l L. 
433, 472–76 (1996). On the related subject of defining minority and indigenous peoples, see 
generally Aukerman, supra note 1. 
 63. See Suberu, supra note 59, at 3–4. 
 64. See Mekuria Bulcha, The Survival and Reconstruction of Oromo National Identity, 
in Being and Becoming Oromo, supra note 37, at 48, 53–55. 
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identity is the exception, not the norm.65 Because most in Ethiopia 
identify primarily with their ethnic group rather than with Ethiopian 
citizenship overall, what could be ordinary political conflicts in a civic 
setting take on an ethnic identity there. If the names of political parties 
were substituted for the ethnic groups in the Berta case, it could appear 
to be an ordinary redistricting case anywhere in the world. Instead, 
because identification is primarily ethnic, and political and social power 
are wielded along ethnic lines, disputes are regarded as ethnic.66  
From these characteristics, the image emerges of ethnic conflicts 
with numerous causes, interwoven with religious, economic, and other 
concerns, and shaped by the particular qualities and interrelationships of 
the involved ethnic communities. Looking ahead to the question of a role 
for legal process, it would be difficult to use the familiar legal categories 
to analyze these ethnic disputes. In particular, much as the political solu-
tion of asymmetry and exceptionalism does not fit a multi-ethnic setting, 
the logic of minority or indigenous rights does not fit a situation in 
which all the parties are minority or indigenous groups. However, the 
complexity and dynamism of the ethnic interrelationships suggest a need 
for process based approaches. In the context of active communities de-
fined by ethnicity and ever changing ethnic allegiances and balances of 
power, it will not be possible for an initial political structure to head off 
all ethnic conflict. 
C. The Second Reality: Democracy as Catalyst for Conflict 
It is tempting to suggest that securing a democratic political system 
and protections for basic civil liberties will allow ethnic disputes to be 
                                                                                                                      
 65. Donald Horowitz noted that surveys in the ethnically divided but politically and 
economically well-developed states of Switzerland and the Netherlands indicated a predomi-
nant identification with the overarching civic state, whereas in the Philippines, Nigeria and 
Ghana, people identified with their own ethnic group and sought to elect members of their 
own ethnic group to the political state to represent their primary, ethnic interests. See Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict, supra note 1, at 6–7, 18–19. In states where ethnic groups lead relatively 
local existences, civic identity tends to be weak and to be constructed through ethnicity, rather 
than the other way around. After all, in an economically and socially divided society in which 
everyday tasks are carried out locally, identifying with the state requires an extension of the 
mind from a tangible, ethnically defined community to a largely theoretical civic one. So the 
Oromo give credence only to an Oromo-based state, and the Silte seek political power through 
ethnic identification. See Suberu, supra note 59, at 6 (“[In Nigeria, t]he extent to which the 
ostensibly innocuous category of ‘statism’ has been able to replace, rather than simply coexist 
with, the more explosive ethnoregional and religious identities is debatable . . . . ”). 
 66. This phenomenon has been noted in other ethnic-identified states as well. For ex-
ample, Horowitz has described the ethnicization of conflicts over facially neutral issues such 
as hydroelectric power in the Philippines, the status of private schools in Malaysia, and mili-
tary court-martials in Nigeria. See Ethnic Groups in Conflict, supra note 1, at 8. During 
Mozambique’s civil war, disfavored officials claimed that a supposedly inter-ethnic opposition 
army actually favored southern ethnic groups at the expense of the northern Makombe people, 
and rumors of bias continued throughout the war. See Weinstein, supra note 53, at 145.  
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worked out in time. But the benefits of democracy and liberty are long-
term. In the short-term they destabilize.  
A transitional period when a state is making its first steps toward 
democracy and civil rights is often a time of great risk for stirring up 
ethnic animosities. In the post-communist Central and Eastern European 
states, for example, “ethnic-nationalist mobilization thrives on the newly 
won political resources (such as the right to form parties, free elections 
and freedom of the media) of liberal democracy.”67 And if there has been 
conflict in some states, in others like Yugoslavia and Rwanda, there has 
been genocide. In both states, politicians and leaders fomented ethnic 
violence as a way of maintaining their power in the midst of democratic 
transitions.68 And in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, expressive media fos-
tered by relatively new civil liberties and abused by political leaders 
provided the means for widespread ethnic appeals to the population and 
rapid disintegration into ethnic warfare.69 In the Ethiopian context, the 
government has repeatedly accused the Oromo press of fomenting un-
rest, and it has detained Oromo journalists and censored newspapers on 
the basis of those claims.70 While the truth of the accusations against the 
Oromo press has not been independently confirmed or refuted, painful 
experience in newly opening societies does demonstrate that freedoms of 
                                                                                                                      
 67. Elster, supra note 3, at 254. Elster and Preuss go on to argue that “such mobiliza-
tion, and through it concomitant spread of fear and distrust, exclusion and repression, is in 
turn a powerful menace to the maintenance of liberal democracy and its basic principle of 
equal and ‘single status’ citizenship, and hence to democratic consolidation in general. In 
short: Democracy is good for ethnic mobilization, but not so vice versa.” Id. (emphasis omit-
ted).  
 68. See Snyder & Ballentine, supra note 7, at 88–89; Magnet, supra note 40, at 401 
(noting the rise of nationalist movements in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of Soviet 
influence). 
 69. Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine argue that because “sudden liberalizations of 
press freedom have been associated with bloody outbursts of popular nationalism,” “promot-
ing unconditional freedom of public debate in newly democratizing societies is, in many 
circumstances, likely to make the problems worse.” Snyder & Ballentine, supra note 7, at 61. 
Specifically, they contend that after sudden liberalization of the press in Rwanda in 1990, “ ‘A 
vibrant press had been born almost overnight,’ but its biased commentary was written ‘in 
terrible bad faith.’ ” Id. at 88 (quoting Gérard Prunier). Extremist ethnic nationalist media 
reports, together with the political threat to the ruling party created by legalization of opposi-
tion political parties and democratic elections, caused the 1993 massacres. Id. at 88–89. They 
sharply criticize subsequent appeals by human rights organizations for democratization and 
liberalization: “the NGOs continue to advocate precisely those measures that their analyses 
show to have triggered the killings: an increase in political pluralism, the prospect of trials for 
the guilty, and the promotion of anti-government media.” Id. at 87. Rather, they contend that 
the lesson from Rwanda is that “the ideals of democratic rights, uncompromising justice, and 
free speech must make pragmatic accommodations to recalcitrant reality.” Id. at 89.. 
 70. See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Overview, Ethiopia (Jan. 2004), at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/21/ethiop6903.htm (last viewed June 11, 2004). 
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speech, press, and association will be used by ethnic groups to promote 
nationalist, and conflict producing, agendas.71  
While civil liberties and free speech are frequently the means of stir-
ring up ethnic conflict, democratic processes such as elections often 
provide the occasion for ethnic disputes. Because political disputes in 
ethnic-identified societies tend to be characterized by the participants in 
ethnic terms, political processes such as elections are often ethnically 
charged, with candidates campaigning on the basis of ethnic loyalties 
and animosities.72 In states such as Zimbabwe, elections have provided 
both an incentive for political leaders to call on ethnic supporters and a 
catalyst for frustrated, long disenfranchised ethnic groups to consider 
and act upon their grievances against an ethnically-defined elite.73 Fur-
thermore, any anomalies in democratic processes may well be blamed on 
ethnic bias.74 We see this in the Berta’s claim that the Gumuz have dis-
proportionate representation in the regional legislature, although in this 
case the ethnic nature of the apportionment of representatives makes 
such claims all but inevitable. 
Not only do young democracies provide the motive and means for 
stirring up ethnic conflict by introducing elections and civil liberties, 
they also provide a hospitable environment for conflict to grow. Indeed, 
an ethnic conflict in a new democracy can move quickly from being an 
isolated social dispute to a challenge to the state’s very existence. With 
some combination of weak economies, new political institutions, and 
shaky social infrastructure, such states suffer both from low credibility 
with ethnic groups and from vulnerability to the disruption caused by 
their crises. In Benshangul-Gumuz, the regional and federal 
                                                                                                                      
 71. More than once, a newly liberalized and unregulated marketplace of ideas has 
spurred immediate exploitation of vulnerable ethnic groups. Veritable Walmarts of ethnic 
conflict have sprung up where only mom and pop stores eked along before. See Snyder & 
Ballentine, supra note 7, at 62–63. 
Just as economic competition produces beneficial results only in a well-
institutionalized marketplace, where monopolies and false advertising are counter-
acted, so too increased debate in the political marketplace leads to better outcomes 
only when there are mechanisms to correct market imperfections. Many newly de-
mocratizing states lack institutions to break up governmental and non-governmental 
information monopolies, to professionalize journalism, and to create common pub-
lic forums where diverse ideas engage each other under conditions in which 
erroneous arguments will be challenged. In the absence of these institutions, an in-
crease in the freedom of speech can create on opening for nationalist mythmakers 
to hijack public discourse. 
Id. 
 72. See Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds 
Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability 161–63 (2003) (reviewing the contribution of democracy 
to ethnic violence but arguing that capitalism plays an overlooked role).  
 73. See id. at 123–30. 
 74. See, e.g., Toungara, supra note 2, at 64. 
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governments are less than ten years old, and the economic and social 
infrastructure is feeble: this region is one of the poorest, most isolated, 
and most undeveloped regions in Ethiopia.75 When the Berta could not 
get what they wanted from the regional legislature, they simply 
abandoned it, escalating the conflict from an isolated political concern 
without collateral effects, to a direct challenge to the working and 
existence of the Benshangul-Gumuz regional state. Likewise, the Oromo 
Liberation Front simply walked out of the federal constitution-drafting 
process when it was not to their liking. When structural solutions fail, 
states need a conflict resolution system that can pull the parties into 
resolving their dispute within the auspices of state institutions. 
Otherwise, they may well resort to self-help that at best will undermine 
the state’s authority and at worst may bring it down. 
It is important to note, however, that there is considerable variation 
in the level of threat that each of these disputes poses to the Ethiopian 
government. While the Berta dispute takes place at the regional level and 
interweaves ethnic with political identifications and concerns, the 
Oromo dispute is with the federal government at the highest level. The 
Berta dispute undermines the authority of the regional government but 
leaves federal legitimacy intact, while the Oromo dispute questions the 
integrity of every level of government. Meanwhile, the Silte do not ques-
tion the legitimacy of any level of government but rather seek to be 
incorporated into it. The Silte dispute presents primarily a local chal-
lenge, the Berta primarily a regional challenge, and the Oromo an all 
encompassing federal one.  
Nonetheless, even conflicts that do not implicate the state’s political 
structure can pose a substantial threat to the young democratic state if 
they are recurrent or raise underlying concerns. The Silte conflict over 
their identity in relation to a larger group was certain to be raised again 
by some other small community even if mediated between the Silte and 
the Gurage. And in Benshangul-Gumuz, it emerged upon investigation 
that the Berta’s claim of underrepresentation was only the tip of the ice-
berg: roughly half the residents of the regional state were utterly 
disenfranchised as members of locally non-indigenous ethnic groups 
who were not entitled to vote.  
Finally, even as participation in democratic institutions may spur 
ethnic conflicts, those institutions are not necessarily capable of resolv-
ing those conflicts. The contention that the Berta’s representation is 
inadequate and the democratically elected legislature unresponsive can-
not be answered by the same democratic processes and legislature the 
Berta challenge as unfair. They require some other arena for resolving 
the dispute.  
                                                                                                                      
 75. See discussion supra note 46. 
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Looking to democratically elected legislatures to resolve systemic 
ethnic conflict is an extremely indirect and gradual approach under the 
best of circumstances. This strategy depends upon the development of 
institutional responsiveness to ethnic concerns and the eventual re-
channeling of power through ethnically neutral civic institutions. Struc-
tural solutions, such as electoral systems that encourage the formation or 
inter-ethnic political coalitions, do seem to foster long-term stability in 
ethnically divided states.76 But without a means for resolving immediate 
conflicts, the state may not survive long enough for this process to suc-
ceed.  
D. The Third Reality: Neutrality Fails Ethnic Conflict 
Although ethnic identification is not consistent over time, it is per-
sistent nonetheless. In the context of strong ethnic identifications, formal 
ethnic neutrality has not proven to be a firm basis for ethnic stability in 
developing and newly democratic multi-ethnic states. For one thing, 
formal policies of ethnic neutrality are rarely matched by actual experi-
ences of ethnic equality. In Ethiopia, the Berta in Benshangul-Gumuz are 
among the most impoverished ethnic groups in the country.77 The Am-
haric vernacular for the Oromo people was, until recently, the highly 
insulting term “galla,” which means “slave.”78 Ethnically neutral policies 
tend to perpetuate existing inequalities, making it impossible for disad-
vantaged groups to aspire to an equal role in political and social life, and 
fostering conflict between advantaged and disadvantaged ethnic groups 
and between disadvantaged ethnic groups and the state.  
In addition, ostensibly ethnically neutral political policies may them-
selves be only superficially neutral. Often, an ascendant ethnic group has 
created a purportedly non-ethnic government structure that is actually 
filled with its own members, and has touted the benefits of ethnic neu-
trality and equality in order to mask its own monopoly on power and the 
underlying power and resource imbalances between ethnic groups.79 
Some claim this is the situation in Ethiopia, contending that the govern-
ment’s message of ethnic inclusiveness and self-determination is mere 
rhetoric masking the ascendancy of the Tigrean nationality.80 
Not only is ethnic neutrality often merely a mask for ethnic inequali-
ties, the civic state may not have the ability to influence these inequalities, 
even if it wishes to do so. Ethnic power structures are often better estab-
                                                                                                                      
 76. See generally Donald L. Horowitz, Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Mak-
ers, 14 J. Democracy, Oct. 2003, at 115. 
 77. See Second Annual Report, supra note 22. 
 78. See Hultin, supra note 47. 
 79. See A Democratic South Africa, supra note 8, at 86. 
 80. See, e.g., Harbeson, supra note 17, at 62; Joseph, supra note 17, at 55. 
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lished and more functional than the civic state in newly democratic and 
transitioning states. Ethiopia’s ethnic groups have been developing for 
over a thousand years, in contrast to the government’s mere decade of 
experience. If the infant civic state tries to compete with longstanding 
ethnic leaders instead of giving them an opportunity to participate in the 
system on behalf of their ethnic constituencies, it encourages them either 
to ignore it or oppose it. Far more rooted in society than relatively new 
and untrusted state structures, ethnicity has the advantage in these com-
petitions.  
Finally, if the state does have some hope of influencing ethnic 
actors, a policy of formal ethnic blindness may undermine that effort. 
Such policies idealize the state as a distant, ethnically uninvolved 
objective actor. At times, this policy is adopted out of admirable ideals of 
equality among people under the law and the government. A civic 
government may wish to hold itself above the fray of ethnic conflict. But 
in the context of actual ethnic strife, such passivity is dangerous.  
This is not to deny or diminish the risk that acknowledgement of 
ethnicity poses. As discussed below in Section III, official recognition of 
ethnicity historically has been used more often to the detriment of non-
dominant ethnic groups than to their benefit. But it is also important to 
recognize that in ethnically divided settings, apparent ethnic neutrality 
can also serve as a means to ethnically biased ends. Certainly, ethnic-
identified states cannot rely upon formal blindness to ethnicity in poli-
cymaking as a blanket solution for ethnic conflicts, and in some 
circumstances, taking account of ethnicity will be more effective than 
ignoring it. The difficult but crucial judgment that ethnic-identified 
states must make, as discussed below, is under which circumstances they 
should take account of ethnicity, and how they should do so. 
It may also be tempting to suggest that even if ethnically neutral 
policies fail in preventing conflict, ethnically neutral institutions may be 
able to resolve them. In particular, ethnic groups could turn to the 
ordinary, ethnically neutral judicial system to handle their disputes as it 
does all others, without resorting to special models or theories of legal 
process. Of course, some multi-ethnic states do rely on the judiciary for 
resolution of ethnic disputes.81 The apparent advantages of using courts 
to address ethnic disputes are obvious: they offer a politically neutral 
                                                                                                                      
 81. Yash Ghai points to South Africa, Spain, India, Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea 
as states where the judiciary has played a significant role in ethnic disputes, to the former 
Yugoslavia and Hong Kong as states in which the courts were disempowered from a role in 
ethnic dispute resolution by political forces, and to Ethiopia as a state at risk of failure due to 
its weak and disempowered judiciary. See Yash Ghai, Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework 
for Analysis, in Autonomy and Ethnicity, supra note 43, at 20–21; see also Nathalie Des 
Rosiers, From Telling to Listening: A Therapeutic Analysis of the Role of Courts in Minority-
Majority Conflicts, 37 Ct. Rev. 54, 60–62 (2000). 
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forum and expertise in dispute resolution. The process of litigation 
requires each party to set forth, substantiate, and permanently record 
their claims and demands, crystallizing and clarifying the parties’ 
positions and goals. Courts are also authoritative mediators whose 
legitimacy is pre-established, who can issue binding judgments to 
resolve nonnegotiable disputes, and who can enforce those judgments 
with the power of the state.  
Or rather, in an idealized state, courts would offer all these benefits. 
In developing or newly democratic states, often they do not. In Ethiopia, 
the courts do not have expertise in resolving group or political disputes. 
Rather, they are used exclusively for criminal prosecutions and individ-
ual claims.82 Far from being politically neutral or legally adept, judges in 
local trial courts are often simply local bureaucrats or local leaders who 
are untrained in the law. The narrow focus of the Ethiopian courts upon 
individual disputes or criminal prosecutions, together with the limited 
resources and personnel of such courts, makes them ill suited to, and ill 
equipped for, ethnic conflict resolution.83  
Fundamentally, the ordinary courts may be unavailable as a forum 
for ethnic groups. The law may not grant standing to ethnic groups as 
parties, or may not recognize group interests or rights.84 Even if the court 
system is technically open to ethnic groups as parties, it may lack credi-
bility with them. While the judiciary may be ostensibly ethnically 
neutral, it is part of the political power structure, which in ethnic-
identified states, may well be tacitly ethnically defined. Ostensible eth-
                                                                                                                      
 82. See Interview with Justice Sinidu Alemu, Ethiopian Supreme Court, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia (Oct. 18, 2002) (on file with author) (interviewee speaking in her personal capacity) 
[hereinafter Alemu Interview]. The Council of Constitutional Inquiry has jurisdiction over 
constitutional claims, and there is no procedural mechanism for instigating class action or 
public interest litigation.  
 83. Even the Ethiopian government itself and commentators sympathetic to the gov-
ernment acknowledge the weakness of the court system as a fundamental problem. See Henze, 
supra note 17, at 52; Embassy of Ethiopia Website, The Judiciary-Structure and Independ-
ence, at http://www.ethiopianembassy.org/judiciary.shtml.  
 84. Civil law systems have tended to adhere strictly to the idea that “only individual 
‘persons’—natural or legal—can be participants in the legal and judicial processes” and thus 
to grant standing only to those groups that have been recognized by the state as “legal per-
sons” generally and not merely for purposes of litigation. Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial 
Process in Comparative Perspective 296 (1989). An interesting example of such legal recogni-
tion was a 1972 French statute that granted standing to bring claims on behalf of racial 
minorities to “every association that has been duly certified at least five years before the time 
of the facts, whose purpose, as set out in its charter, is to fight against racism,” but not, appar-
ently, to minority groups themselves. Id. at 287 n.71. As indicated by this example, ethnic 
groups and other groups that are either “non-personalized, unincorporated, de facto organiza-
tions and other associations” or “organizations . . . seeking access to court . . . to protect the 
rights of their members or the collective rights of classes or groups” have often found them-
selves without standing to bring their claims. Id. at 297. 
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nic neutrality may mask underlying ethnic domination, or may at least be 
perceived as doing so.85  
In addition, the nature of ethnic claims may make use of the ordinary 
judicial system difficult. Some ethnic conflicts do not involve strictly 
legal claims at all, but political or social ones ungrounded in any particu-
lar law. The Oromo, for example, have not characterized their claims in 
legal terms. Attempting to shoehorn the parties’ non-legal interests into 
legal claims may well obfuscate the parties’ concerns rather than clarify-
ing them. Furthermore, such legal maneuvering may not even be 
possible. While in common law systems courts may be willing to con-
sider claims based on unwritten common law rights, in civil law 
systems, judges are reluctant to create rights from past practice or to ex-
pansively interpret legal provisions to permit new claims.86 It would be 
impossible to bring the Berta’s representation case to court without gov-
erning legislation for the court to apply.  
Civil law systems have historically been inhospitable not only to 
ethnic claims but to many public interest claims and group claims. Pub-
lic and private law have typically been strictly divided into separate 
spheres, and only the state has traditionally had jurisdiction to bring pub-
lic claims. At times, legislatures have passed laws specifically 
authorizing certain public claims or granting standing to certain groups, 
and at times courts have recognized such claims and groups, but by and 
large the use of the ordinary courts for public interest litigation pushes 
the civil law processes and judges outside of their usual role.87 
Practically speaking, litigation on issues of public relevance and 
group rights is a complex and grinding task even in systems that are set 
up to accommodate such claims. In any setting, it is difficult for parties 
to adduce evidence for broad social claims. Likewise, it is difficult for 
courts to handle complex facts or to oversee complex solutions; rather, 
such claims take courts far outside the realm of core legal analysis.  
                                                                                                                      
 85. See A Democratic South Africa, supra note 8, at 86. 
 86. See Cappelletti, supra note 84, at 294–95 (“[T]he education and training of civil 
law judges, rooted in many layers of civil law history and in a rigid conception of separation 
of powers, makes them . . . wary of too evident manifestations of law-making through the 
courts.”) 
 87.  
The ‘proprietary’ concept of rights and locus standi is very clear and simple in the 
civil law tradition—indeed much too simple to reflect present realities. . . . Today’s 
reality . . . is much more complex and pluralistic than that abstract dichotomy [be-
tween public and private]: between the individual and the state there are numerous 
groups, communities, and collectivities which forcefully claim the enjoyment and 
judicial protection of certain rights which are classifiable neither as ‘public’ nor 
‘private’ in the traditional sense. 
Id. at 273. 
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Furthermore, in many developing states, far from being authoritative 
decision-makers, the legitimacy and credibility of the judicial system is 
low even for the purposes for which it is generally used, much less for 
the innovative purpose of resolving ethnic conflicts.88 This makes parties 
reluctant to bring their claims to court, and also exacerbates the always 
present problem of enforcing any judgment, particularly in politically or 
socially charged cases. In Ethiopia, it is common wisdom that taking a 
case to court is a good way to extend the dispute forever. Through a 
combination of lack of court resources to address cases in a timely man-
ner, corrupt clerks willing to lose files for a small price, and the 
availability of repeated appeals, a defendant can avoid judgment for 
years. And when judgment is finally handed down, who will make the 
defendant comply?89 
In states with well respected judicial systems that are equipped and 
accustomed to handing political claims, resort to the courts to resolve 
ethnic disputes might be appropriate. And when ethnic disputes can be 
narrowed to individual specifically legal claims, such as a claim of false 
arrest on the basis of ethnicity, courts may be well suited to handle those 
claims as well. But where ethnic conflict claims fall far outside the norm 
of the disputes the courts ordinarily handle, or where the courts’ credibil-
ity and resources are low, relying primarily on the courts to resolve 
ethnic disputes is not a good option. Furthermore, where there is deep 
suspicion of ethnic bias within ostensibly neutral state structures, express 
acknowledgement of ethnicity and ethnic interests offers more hope of 
inspiring confidence than claims of neutrality.   
However, legal process may have a role to play in ethnic disputes, 
even if the ordinary courts may not be the best place for the resolution of 
an immediate conflict. Many of the inadequacies of the ordinary judicial 
system described above stem not from the nature of legal process, but 
from the blindness of ethnically neutral legal institutions to ethnic con-
cerns. Accordingly, these inadequacies reveal some of the qualities that 
would promote successful use of legal process in resolving these dis-
putes. If a judicial institution were to acknowledge ethnic groups as 
proper parties, recognize their interests and claims as genuine communi-
ties representing their members, openly admit the ethnic nature of their 
conflicts, and craft procedures that facilitated consideration of complex 
group and social concerns, they might be able to address ethnic concerns 
after all. 
                                                                                                                      
 88. See id. at 158–59. 
 89. This assessment of the common wisdom on the court system is based on my con-
versations with dozens of people and visits to several courts during 2002. Whatever the truth 
of these claims, the common adherence to these beliefs indicates that the courts’ credibility is 
low. 
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III. Legal Process Models at Work in 
Ethnic Conflict Resolution 
The grave risk that inter-ethnic conflict poses to multi-ethnic states 
and the seeming inevitability of periodic disputes arising among ethnic-
identified communities together provide states with a powerful incentive 
to develop methods of conflict resolution. Legal processes present one 
possible approach.  
But the three realities discussed in the last Section warn that an eth-
nic conflict resolution system will need to be carefully tailored to 
succeed. Because inter-ethnic relationships and conflicts are legion and 
variable, legal processes and categories must be flexible enough to ac-
commodate these differences. Because democracy and civil liberties tend 
to foster rather than to resolve immediate ethnic conflicts, legal proc-
esses cannot rely on these characteristics as stabilizing elements. 
Because ethnic-blind policies and institutions are often ineffective, legal 
processes must find appropriate ways of taking account of ethnicity. 
What advantages can legal processes bring to ethnic conflict resolu-
tion? The Ethiopian system provides a useful context for considering this 
question, because it blends legal and political processes to create a hy-
brid conflict resolution system aimed specifically at ethnic conflict.  
The Ethiopian system has three distinctive qualities: it establishes a 
permanent, ethnic focused institution that grants some measure of stand-
ing to all ethnic groups; it is structured to employ complementary 
consensual and adjudicative processes; and it relies on constitutional 
interpretation to resolve national disputes. Each of these qualities reflects 
a concern for the realities discussed in the last Section . Each also raises 
a fundamental question about the appropriate role of legal process in 
ethnic conflicts that deserves further consideration: Should states ever 
recognize ethnic groups? Which aspects of legal process might be effec-
tive in resolving ethnic conflicts? And what kinds of constitutional 
principles and standing will be appropriate for the ethnic conflict con-
text? 
Part A of this Section will provide an introduction to the Ethiopian 
system and describe how that system addressed the problems of the 
Berta, the Silte, and the Oromo. Part B will consider the distinctive 
qualities of the Ethiopian system in turn, discussing their relationship to 
the realities discussed in the last Section, their effectiveness in the con-
text of the Berta, Silte, and Oromo conflicts, and the questions they raise 
about the potential for legal process to resolve ethnic conflicts. 
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A. The Ethiopian System 
1. Structure 
Ethiopia is a place of extremes. It is an ancient nation with a young 
government, and a vast nation that is deeply impoverished.90 Several 
million people have crowded into the capital city of Addis Ababa, but 
ninety percent of Ethiopians still make their living as subsistence farm-
ers or pastoralists across the country’s dry mountain highlands, parched 
desert lowlands, and damp agricultural plains.91 Ethiopia has been 
racked by wars during the last thirty years, but it has thus far avoided the 
gruesome mob marauding and genocides that have engulfed so many 
states.92 Ethiopia calls itself a “Nation of Nations,” and with hundreds of 
small, discrete ethnic communities, it has good claim to that title.93  
The extremity of Ethiopia’s circumstances has fostered a willingness 
to adopt extreme political strategies. Foremost among these is its policy 
toward its ethnic groups. When it established its new government in 
1994, Ethiopia adopted a political structure that it calls “ethnic federal-
ism.” It organized the regional states of its federation as nearly as 
possible along ethnic lines.94 All ethnic groups, not just minority or in-
digenous groups, have the constitutional right of self-determination. That 
right is nearly absolute, including not only cultural rights, but self-
government, statehood, and even secession.95  
In the broadest sense, this is a classic political structural solution to 
ethnicity: Ethiopia has designed the framework of its political institu-
tions with the express purpose of defusing ethnic tensions and 
preventing ethnic conflicts. But unlike most such solutions, it incorpo-
rates and emphasizes ethnicity rather than attempting to counterbalance 
or ignore it. Other countries have structured at least some regional states 
along ethnic lines, but only rarely is this the exclusive method of draw-
                                                                                                                      
 90. The Axumite state, the earliest cognizable predecessor to present-day Ethiopia and 
the foundation of its national identity, was established in approximately 100 A.D., so by this 
measure Ethiopia is nearly 2,000 years old. See Aberra Jembere, An Introduction to the Legal 
History of Ethiopia: 1434–1974 (2000); Marcus, supra note 21, at 5. In contrast, the current 
government is only about ten years old. See Constitution Proclamation, supra note 22. Re-
garding Ethiopia’s economic condition, see discussion supra note 22. 
 91. See FDRE Parliament website, supra note 20. 
 92. Ethiopia has suffered a military coup, 17 years of civil war and 12 years of border 
wars since 1974. See discussion supra notes 21–22. 
 93. See, e.g., Eth. Const. pmbl. (opening with “We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peo-
ples of Ethiopia.”); see also FDRE Parliament website, supra note 20; Embassy of Ethiopia 
website, Population, supra note 21 (describing the country as “a mosaic of diverse people 
who live peacefully, side-by-side speaking a multitude of different tongues, practicing differ-
ent religions and customs, and celebrating a rich and eclectic history.”). 
 94. See Eth. Const. art. 47. 
 95. Id. art. 39. 
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ing borders.96 And the universal and virtually unqualified right of seces-
sion held by Ethiopia’s Nationalities is, to my knowledge, 
unprecedented. 
Ethnic federalism is controversial. Critics charge that using ethnicity 
as a building block for the government feeds nationalist fervor and sets 
the stage for inter-ethnic violence. Some argue that the right of secession 
in particular is a catalyst for conflict, and that its guarantees of self-
government are hopelessly divisive and complex. Others claim that eth-
nic federalism is a mere sham to disguise the hegemony of a single 
ethnic group.97  
These criticisms may be well founded. Certainly there is no consen-
sus on an appropriate design for political structures in ethnic-identified 
                                                                                                                      
 96. There are a number of federations that have at least some ethnically defined semi-
autonomous federal units. Kymlicka lists Canada, Switzerland, Belgium, Nigeria, India, Ma-
laysia, Ethiopia, Spain and Russia. See Kymlicka, supra note 58, at 211 and 211 n.8. In 
addition, China has a unitary state structure with semi-autonomous territories for recognized 
minority ethnic groups. See Yash Ghai, Autonomy Regimes in China: Coping with Ethnic and 
Economic Diversity, in Autonomy and Ethnicity, supra note 43, at 78, 82–84. 
But these federations are different from Ethiopia in one of two important respects. First, 
many of these states have majority ethnic groups, and their primary subdivisions as a federa-
tion are not ethnic in nature but are simply regional administrative subdivisions. Canada, 
Spain, and Russia are examples of this primarily administrative structure. See Kymlicka, su-
pra note 58, at 212 n.9. In these states, the ethnic subdivisions are anomalous among the 
federal subdivisions and therefore do not transform national politics as a whole into an ethni-
cally determined arena by virtue of their existence. So one would not regard the Canadian 
federation, for example, as being one primarily determined by ethnicity although the state of 
Quebec is ethnically defined, nor would one describe Canadian national politics as being 
driven primarily by ethnicity by virtue of the existence of Quebec. See generally Watts, supra 
note 43, at 29. 
Also, the federations in which the federal subdivisions are primarily or absolutely ethnic 
or ethno-linguistic in nature tend to have substantially simpler political structures than Ethio-
pia does. Both Belgium and Switzerland, for example, are composed of only a few primary 
linguistic groups, each with its own federal subdivision, within a relatively small total geo-
graphical area. In contrast, Ethiopia has over 80 ethnic groups divided between 11 federal 
subdivisions defined by the dominant ethnic group in that territory, within a relatively large 
total geographical area. There are also, of course, differences in resources and development, as 
well as differences in the comparative development of a unifying national culture and civic 
society, and in the strength of federal institutions. In sum, Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism differs 
from other federations in being so complexly and completely ethnically defined. 
 97. For competing views on the questions of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism and whether 
it represents true democracy or one-party rule, compare Henze, supra note 17, with Joseph, 
supra note 17, and Harbeson, supra note 17. See also Selassie, supra note 17. The EPRDF, the 
ruling party, is a coalition of four ethnic parties, the TPLF, the Amhara National Democratic 
Movement, the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (“OPDO”), and the Southern Ethio-
pia Peoples Democratic Organization (“SEPDO”). See Ethiopian Embassy website, Political 
Parties, supra note 21. Opponents contend this coalition is in fact controlled by the TPLF; 
see, e.g., Harbeson, supra note 17, at 65–67. According to the Ethiopian Parliament website, 
the EPRDF currently controls 481 of the 547 seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives, 
the lower, legislative house of the federal Parliament. See House of the People’s Representa-
tives website, Party Affiliation of Members of The House of Peoples’ Representatives, at http:// 
www.ethiopar.net/English/hopre/politi.htm (last viewed May 23, 2004). 
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states.98 But ethnic federalism is not the whole of the Ethiopian approach 
to ethnicity. Ethiopia has also established a conflict resolution system 
directed specifically at ethnic disputes. Amidst the hubbub over the eth-
nic federalist structure, the conflict resolution aspect of the Ethiopian 
system has been neglected. It deserves consideration on its own merits.  
Ethiopia’s conflict resolution system is centered in the institution of 
the House of the Federation, the upper house of Parliament. While the 
lower house has legislative powers and its members are elected from 
districts within each regional state, the House of the Federation has a 
different composition and role. It is composed of representatives from 
each of the Nationalities.99 It does not have traditional legislative powers 
but rather is charged by the constitution with maintaining the country’s 
ethnic, regional and federal relationships.100 This includes the roles of 
dispute resolution and constitutional interpretation.101 
Under the auspices of this constitutional authority, the House of the 
Federation effectively has jurisdiction over all ethnic disputes, whether 
formal or informal, legal or political, big or small. Because the regional 
states are defined by their ethnic composition, the House of the 
Federation’s powers with respect to the regional states are interrelated 
with its powers with respect to Nationalities, and inter-state disputes are 
often ethnic disputes as well.102 Similarly, because the constitution 
establishes Nationalities rather than individuals as the fundamental 
constituents of the Ethiopian federation, many aspects of the constitution 
                                                                                                                      
 98. See Ethnic Groups in Conflict, supra note 1, at 601–02. 
 99. Each Nationality is entitled to one representative, plus an additional representative 
for each one million of its population. See Eth. Const. art. 61, §§ 1–2. Representatives are not 
elected directly by each Nationality en masse, however. Rather, each regional state council 
selects the representatives for the Nationalities that comprise it. See id. art. 62, § 3. While the 
constitution permits the regional state councils to organize direct elections within their region, 
none have done so. Rather, all have maintained the power to choose the representatives them-
selves. Because representation is organized by regional state, even if the regional states were 
to hold direct elections, a Nationality that was spread across two or more regional states would 
elect its representatives separately within each regional state. See Megiso Interview, supra 
note 24.  
 100. It has other powers as well, including allocating tax revenues between the federal 
and regional state governments. See Eth. Const. art. 62. 
 101. For a discussion of the decision to give the power of constitutional interpretation to 
a house of the Parliament, see discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 102. Similarly, many local communities are defined by ethnicity and so local political 
disputes may be ethnic in character. In considering the Ethiopian constitution, and especially 
the role of the House of the Federation, it is essential to keep in mind that strong ethnic identi-
fications are at play in many matters of public concern. The House of the Federation has the 
responsibility of resolving disputes between Nationalities both directly by intervening or me-
diating in disputes and indirectly by “promoting unity” and deciding underlying constitutional 
issues. See Eth. Const. art. 62. 
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and constitutional interpretation will have at least some ethnic aspect, 
well beyond the express Nationality rights themselves.103 
Apart from the constitutionally prescribed procedures for handling 
Nationalities’ petitions for statehood or secession, the House has discre-
tion under the constitution to create whatever procedures it sees fit for 
adjudicating these disputes.104 When the Berta and Silte cases were first 
taken under consideration, the House was still developing its procedures 
and no law had yet been passed governing its activities. Under a more 
recent law consolidating the House’s authority, the House maintains con-
siderable flexibility.105 The procedures set forth in this law to some 
extent represent the prior practice of the House. Certain elements, how-
ever, are aspirational, such as specific deadlines for issuing decisions, 
and stricter exhaustion, standing, and other admissibility requirements.  
Most cases are intended to move through a multi-stage process. 
Upon receiving a petition, the House initially encourages direct negotia-
tion between the parties. If this fails, the case progresses to mediation by 
House representatives, and then to adjudication by the House as a final 
measure. The exceptions to this pattern are cases that call for constitu-
tional interpretation, claims by Nationalities for enforcement of 
constitutional rights, and border disputes: in these cases the House’s role 
is adjudicative.106  
                                                                                                                      
 103. See id. art. 8 (“All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peo-
ples of Ethiopia.”). 
 104. See id. arts. 39, 47. 
 105. The law lists categories of disputes and very general descriptions of the processes 
for each. In the catch-all category of “miscellaneous misunderstandings and disputes,” the 
House has authority to “strive to find a solution in any mechanism possible.” HOF Proclama-
tion, supra note 22, art. 32(2). 
 106. Specifically, in any dispute concerning a Nationality’s constitutional rights, the 
Nationality itself has standing to petition the House directly. The Nationality must first ex-
haust state-level procedures, and its representatives must meet certain requirements to 
demonstrate genuine agency. This part of the law is silent on the question of negotiation or 
mediation, stating simply that the House “shall make [a] decision.” It is interesting to note that 
while the subject of Nationality claims is limited to implementation of constitutional rights, 
the law does not presume that this would necessarily fall under the House’s general power of 
constitutional interpretation and the related procedures. See id. arts. 19–22.  
In cases of border disputes, the law also does not mandate negotiation or mediation. 
Rather, the House is to hold a popular referendum of the affected communities and gather 
evidence of settlement patterns before adjudicating the matter. The law does not state who has 
standing to bring a border dispute nor what procedure the petitioner should follow. See id. arts. 
27–31. 
In all other cases, the process moves from consensual to adjudicative methods. In 
disputes between states or between states and the federal government, the law calls for 
facilitation and mediation of direct discussions between the parties, followed by submission of 
the dispute to the House if those negotiations fail. If submitted, the House must either 
facilitate further discussions between the parties or take arguments and evidence in writing 
from them to adjudicate the case. It can put into place a preliminary solution in the interim. 
The text of the law is ambiguous as to whether this category comprises only disputes 
exclusively between government entities, or whether it also includes disputes between 
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Ethiopia’s conflict resolution system is thus a blend of the legal and 
the political on several levels. At the institutional level, the House of the 
Federation is a quintessentially political body, but one that has been des-
ignated for adjudicative purposes. At the process level, the act of 
constitutional interpretation is a trademark legal process, but one that is 
fraught with political concerns, while processes of mediation and adjudi-
cation are used in both legal and political settings. Finally, ethnic 
conflicts are themselves often an unstable combination of the legal and 
the political. The procedures set forth in the constitution and the relevant 
law are described in extremely broad terms, and could be carried out in 
ways that pushed the House’s adjudicative style either more toward the 
political or toward the legal aspects of its role. Accordingly, it is through 
the practices that the House is developing to carry out its hybrid role that 
the balance between the legal and the political will be drawn.107 
Implementation of this program has not been a panacea for Ethio-
pia’s ethnic conflict.108 Indeed, it is too early to assess the system’s 
ultimate success. Ten years into the existence of the new constitution and 
its conflict resolution system, implementation is just beginning. But the 
preliminary successes and failures in the Berta, Silte, and Oromo cases 
offer insight into the potential of processes focused specifically on ethnic 
conflict, point to concerns that should be addressed in determining 
                                                                                                                      
Nationalities or individuals and government entities. See id. arts. 23–26. In cases of other 
“miscellaneous disputes,” the House has absolute discretion to use any means to resolve the 
disputes, although there is again an emphasis on consensual resolution if possible. See id. art. 
32. 
Finally, as a general matter, the House is directed to study and institutionalize traditional 
mechanisms of conflict prevention and resolution. See id. art. 33.  
 107. The distinction between legal and political processes in matters of public dispute is not 
well-defined even in theory. Although they are to some extent adjudicative, Ethiopia’s processes are 
certainly not judicial, as they do not meet the core requirements of an independent, neutral judge 
and of an adjudicative process with established procedures that meet basic due process standards. 
However, while traditional legal process theory might marry the judicial and the legal, modern 
practice and theory often take a broader view, characterizing certain non-judicial processes as none-
theless legal. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.  
 108. Conflicts between ethnic groups and the government, and amongst ethnic groups 
themselves, continue in various regions of the country, and these conflicts are sometimes violent. 
See EHRCO Condemns Recent Attack Committed in Gambella, Addis Trib. (Jan. 16, 2004), at 
http://www.addistribune.com/Archives/2004/01/16-01-04/EHRCO.htm (last visited July 21, 2004); 
Ethnic Violence Leaves 18 Dead in the East, Africa News (Feb. 6, 2004), available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200402060003.html; Ethiopia: Rights Organization Condemns Arrests 
of Oromo Students (Mar. 3, 2004), at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID= 
39804&SelectRegion= Horn_of_Africa&SelectCountry=ETHIOPIA (on file with author); More 
than 30 Said Dead, 100 Wounded in Awassa, Eth. Rep. No. 299 (May 29, 2002), available at 
http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/eng_newspaper/Htm/No299/r299new2.htm (last visited June 9, 
2004) (on file with author); ETHIOPIA: Interview with President of Southern Nations Region 
(SNNPR), Jul. 19, 2002, at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID= 28902&SelectRegion= 
Horn_of_Africa (last visited Aug. 21, 2002) (on file with author). 
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whether and how to offer such processes, and suggest factors that may 
weigh on their ultimate effectiveness. 
2. The Berta: Mediation 
When the Berta Nationality walked out of the Benshangul-Gumuz 
regional parliament over the issue of proportionate representation, they 
brought it to a halt. The Benshangul-Gumuz government asked the 
Prime Minister’s Office to intervene, but the Berta reportedly rejected 
the proffered negotiators as likely to favor the regional government. The 
Benshangul-Gumuz government and the Berta then jointly appealed to 
the House of the Federation to consider the case under the auspices of its 
constitutional authority over inter-ethnic and regional conflicts.109  
The House of the Federation has established a Committee for States’ 
Affairs to mediate conflicts between Nationalities and between regional 
states, and to address ethnic and regional concerns.110 This committee 
will accept a case upon the request of both parties, or upon the request of 
one party if they have failed to resolve the problem between themselves 
after two years.111 As both the Berta and the regional government had 
requested its participation, the committee delegated mediators from 
among its members to meet with them.112  
The mediators’ preliminary goal was to negotiate a framework for 
resolving the representation issue. The first step was to persuade Berta 
representatives to return to the regional parliament. To change the 
                                                                                                                      
 109. The Prime Minister’s Office has established regional desks for each regional state, 
and this was the first line of recourse taken by the Benshangul-Gumuz state government. But 
the Prime Minister’s Office met with no success. The Berta refused to even discuss the issue. 
Appointments to the regional desks at the Prime Minister’s Office are made by the regional 
governments, and so the Berta apparently viewed the Prime Minister’s officials as representa-
tives of regional interests. See Adew/Megiso Interview, supra note 24; Alemayehu June 6, 
2002 Interview, supra note 26; Megiso Interview, supra note 24. It is interesting to note that 
the Benshangul-Gumuz government went first to the Prime Minister’s Office for help rather 
than to the House. There are a variety of reasons this might have come about ranging from the 
practical (for example, the House is only in session at certain times, whereas the Prime Minis-
ter’s office operates year-round) to the political motives discussed above.  
 110. Of course, in light of the ethnic federalist structure of the regional states, there is 
substantial overlap between inter-ethnic and regional concerns. See FDRE Parliament website, 
Committee for States’ Affairs: Introduction, supra note 20. 
 111. The law governing the House of the Federation’s activities sets a slightly different 
exhaustion requirement and establishes certain formal requirements for establishing a Nation-
ality’s standing in a case involving its constitutional rights, but that law took effect after the 
Berta case began. I am told that the practice that had developed before the law was passed is 
as described here. See id.; Adew/Megiso Interview, supra note 24; Alemayehu June 6, 2002 
Interview, supra note 26; Megiso Interview, supra note 24.  
 112. The committee’s procedural rules do not outline the processes to be used in consid-
ering cases with any specificity, but its practice has been to delegate committee members, as 
well as other members of the House, as mediators. These delegates have met with disputing 
parties in an attempt to mediate a resolution and also have participated directly in the imple-
mentation of the agreed upon solution. See Megiso Interview, supra note 24. 
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Berta’s representation—even if an agreement were reached—the re-
gional state would have to amend its constitution.113 This would not 
happen overnight. In the meantime, what would keep this conflict from 
becoming a crisis would be to enable the regional parliament to begin 
governing again. The mediators achieved this goal: the parties agreed to 
a temporary compromise provisionally allocating additional representa-
tives to the Berta in return for their agreement to return to the legislature. 
The second step was to develop a procedure for moving forward. To this 
end, the mediators created an independent commission to study the par-
liamentary representation in the region and provide a recommendation 
that would be binding on both parties.114  
With this framework in place, the Berta returned to participate in the 
regional government and the immediate crisis, together with its immedi-
ate and escalating costs, was resolved.115 But the basic conflict carried 
on.  
The commission’s study of regional representation unearthed more 
complexities. While the Berta might have been underrepresented in the 
regional government, the Nationalities that were not indigenous to that 
region—comprising 47 percent of the population—were not entitled to 
any political representation at all.116 In addition, the question of political 
representation overlapped with issues of resource allocation by the re-
gional government, of the proportionality of representation in the federal 
government, and of the use of regional languages.117 These factors, as 
                                                                                                                      
 113. See Alemayehu June 6, 2002 Interview, supra note 26. 
 114. The Benshangul-Gumuz government also agreed to implement the committee’s 
recommendations immediately. The provisional allocation of regional representatives to the 
Berta was done in proportion to the Gumuz’s representation, and additional regional 
representatives were also given to the Shinasha, another local ethnic group. See Berta 
Agreement, supra note 25. This agreement was the result of a fruitless month of meetings in 
Benshangul-Gumuz and a final, successful meeting with the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of 
the House of the Federation in Addis Ababa. See Adew/Megiso Interview, supra note 24.  
 115. See Megiso Interview, supra note 24. 
 116. While the Berta, the Gumuz and the smaller ethnic groups comprise 100% of the 
Benshangul-Gumuz population with political recognition and regional government representa-
tion, they constitute only 53% of the total population of the area. The other 47% are “non-
indigenous” ethnic groups who apparently have no political recognition or representation in 
Benshangul-Gumuz at all. These are Nationalities that are “non-indigenous” to Benshangul-
Gumuz but indigenous to Ethiopia, such as the Oromo, Amhara, Tigreans and Hadiya. Their 
core populations live in other regions of the country. They are generally spread throughout the 
woredas of the region, although some groups do constitute a majority in certain woredas. Al-
though the House of the Federation delegates have submitted their recommendations to the 
regional government on the narrower Berta-Gumuz representation question, this overarching 
issue has yet to be resolved. The House of the Federation’s States’ Affairs Committee and 
Legal Affairs Committee are both reviewing the problem. See id. It is not clear whether the 
lack of representation was due to a deliberate distinction between regionally indigenous and 
non-indigenous Nationalities, a failure to properly conduct the census, a sudden population 
shift between censuses, or some other reason. 
 117. See Megiso Interview, supra note 24. 
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well as mundane procedural delays, led to an extension of the study pe-
riod from 45 days to over two years.118 The mediators referred the legal 
questions to the House’s Legal Committee. Debate on the study’s pur-
portedly binding recommendations continues to date, and at the time this 
was written, no solution had yet been implemented.119  
3. The Silte: Constitutional Interpretation 
The Silte community’s appeal for recognition as a Nationality, inde-
pendent of the larger Gurage Nationality, raised basic questions about 
ethnicity. What defines a cognizable ethnic group? Should ethnicity be 
determined by self-definition or are there objective factors that should be 
considered? Who should decide: the group seeking independence, the 
larger ethnic group, or some third party? These were vital questions not 
only for the Silte and the Gurage, but also for the many other ethnic 
communities that were part of larger, recognized Nationalities, and 
therefore for the country as a whole.120  
The Ethiopian constitution provides a substantive definition of a 
Nationality and sets forth Nationality rights, but does not delegate 
authority or create a process for recognizing Nationalities.121 Until the 
Silte’s petition, the government had relied on long established ethnic 
categories used under previous governments in carrying out the census 
                                                                                                                      
 118. With control of the regional government had come control of regional allocation of 
resources, so that the Berta claimed that they had not received their proper share of funding 
and government facilities for a number of years. The House of the Federation delegates there-
fore undertook to study not just population patterns but also issues of economic bias and 
electoral inconsistencies in each zone and woreda. They compared, for example, the numbers 
of teachers and doctors allocated by the regional government to different areas. See id. Al-
though at the regional level the Berta appeared to be underrepresented in the government, at 
the federal level they had five representatives to the Gumuz’s two, requiring an assessment of 
federal representation and election districts and practices as well.  
 119. See Berta Agreement, supra note 25; Megiso Interview, supra note 24. 
 120. See Levine, supra note 27. 
 121. The federal constitution does set forth the substantive rights of Nations, Nationali-
ties and Peoples, the basic procedures by which recognized Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
can exercise their rights to secession and statehood, and, as discussed above, it establishes the 
five substantive factors that define a cognizable Nation, Nationality or People. Nationality 
rights include self-determination, secession, use of own language, protection of own culture 
and history, and self-government (including the right to establish solely national institutions 
and equitable representation in regional and federal institutions). See Eth. Const. arts. 39, 
§§ 1–3, art. 47, § 2. In order to form its own regional state, a Nationality must receive ap-
proval from its legislative council, present a written demand to the regional council, and 
receive approval from its people in a referendum organized by the region, upon which the 
region must transfer the relevant powers to the Nationality and the Nationality automatically 
becomes a regional state of the federation. See id. art. 47, § 3. Similarly, in order to secede, a 
Nationality must first become a regional state; then receive approval from its legislative coun-
cil; and finally, win a vote of its people in a referendum organized by the federal government; 
whereupon the federal government must transfer the appropriate powers and assets to the 
Nationality. See id. art. 39, § 4. 
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to define its Nationalities. When the Silte formally petitioned for new 
recognition as a Nationality, they forced the government to confront 
these jurisdictional and procedural questions.122  
As required by the constitution, the House had established an advi-
sory body, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (“the Council”), to carry 
out the actual work of interpreting the constitution.123 The Council is 
composed of legal experts, including the President and Vice President of 
the Federal Supreme Court, and also includes three members of the 
House who are not required to have any legal expertise.124 The House 
and the Council have the authority to accept petitions for interpretation 
directly from a wide range of parties.125 Upon accepting a petition for 
constitutional interpretation, the Council performs the legal analysis and 
presents a recommendation to the House, and the House considers the 
recommendation and issues a final decision.126  
The process of constitutional interpretation is accessible enough on 
paper, but in reality it required some tenacity for the Silte’s claim to be 
heard. Although at the time there were no formal legal barriers to sub-
mitting a petition, the House’s decision to exercise its jurisdiction is 
discretionary.127 The Southern Nations’ government did not want to take 
                                                                                                                      
 122. In the absence of constitutional guidance, the House insisted that the Southern Na-
tions regional state should take the lead in determining the proper procedure over a matter 
entirely internal to the regional state. The Southern Nations council contended this was an 
issue for the House as the body empowered to decide Nationality issues. Neither one appeared 
eager to claim responsibility for the issue. See Request for Constitutional Interpretation, Silte 
case, supra note 28.  
 123. See Eth. Const. art. 83.  
 124. See id. art. 82. 
 125. At the time of this case, there were no laws governing the procedures of the Council 
or the House, but they had developed certain practices. The laws passed after the Silte case 
provide that the Council can entertain issues arising in court cases upon the petition of the 
court or a party; it can accept petitions from anyone alleging a violation of his or her funda-
mental rights and freedoms (which include the rights of ethnic groups, although the language 
of the relevant law refers here to “persons” rather than “persons and Nationalities”) upon 
exhaustion of other remedies; and it can accept petitions from a federal or state legislative or 
executive council by the vote of only one-third of the members. The law governing the 
House’s authority also specifically authorizes Nationalities to petition the House concerning 
alleged violations of their constitutional rights, and the House could then pass claims requiring 
constitutional interpretation to the Council itself. See CCI Proclamation, supra note 22, arts. 
21–23; HOF Proclamation, supra note 22; see also Alemayehu June 6, 2002 Interview, supra 
note 26. 
 126. See CCI Proclamation, supra note 22. 
 127. In practice, it appears that the Council has accepted as presenting admissible 
constitutional questions only certain petitions that have been referred to it by the House, and 
not petitions that have been submitted to it by Nationalities or individuals directly. In addition, 
there are substantial delays in the Council’s process of considering even those petitions that 
have been passed on to it by the House, because the Council meets only rarely due to 
shortages of staff and resources, as well as the fact that all of its members hold at least one 
other full-time job and are located in distant locations across the country. See Alemu 
Interview, supra note 82. 
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any action in the Silte case until it had obtained an authoritative judg-
ment on its jurisdiction and the procedure it should follow. The House, 
however, refused to consider the petition until the Southern Nations gov-
ernment had issued its own final decision in the matter. Between the 
Southern Nations’ repeated attempts to persuade the House to accept the 
petition, and the regional process of reaching a decision after it aban-
doned these efforts, several years elapsed.128  
When the Council at last turned to the Silte case, it focused its 
opinion on the jurisdictional and procedural questions, affirming the 
substantive constitutional definition of a Nationality with little 
comment.129 In the absence of direct constitutional guidance, the Council 
turned to latent constitutional principles for guidance. From the central 
place that ethnic rights of self-determination occupy in the Ethiopian 
constitution, the Council discerned a constitutional intent to give 
unrecognized ethnic communities control of the process of determining 
their status. Accordingly, the Council granted the primary authority for 
determining identity to the petitioning community, and created a four 
step process. First, community representatives must present a petition for 
recognition as a Nationality to the regional state government. In 
response, the regional state must conduct a study of whether the 
community has met the constitutional definition of a Nationality and 
present the study to the petitioning community. That community must 
then vote on the issue through a popular referendum. If the results of the 
referendum and the study are in agreement, then the decision is final. 
But if either party is aggrieved, it can petition the House for review. 
However, the House’s review will be limited to determining whether the 
process followed was constitutional, and it apparently will not review 
the merits. Notably absent in this structure is any role for the larger 
concerned community, in this case the Gurage Nationality from whom 
the Silte were seeking to separate.130  
                                                                                                                      
 128. See Request for Constitutional Interpretation, Silte case, supra note 28. The laws 
passed after the Silte case require exhaustion of state remedies before a person or Nationality 
can petition, but do not expressly require any exhaustion or decision by the state government 
for the state itself to refer a constitutional claim. Rather, the state is merely required to muster 
a 1/3 vote of its legislature or executive. See CCI Proclamation, supra note 22, arts. 21–23; 
HOF Proclamation, supra note 22, art. 20. 
 129. The first question—what is a nationality?—had a definite, if unsatisfying, constitu-
tional answer. The Council adopted the five factors listed in the constitution without 
attempting to make the categories more determinate or to provide any guidance on how they 
should be applied. See Presentation of Proposal for a Decision to the House of Federation, ref. 
no. h/te/m-fe15/40/3/1 (Alexandria Translations trans., Jan. 26, 2000) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Proposed Decision, Silte case]. 
 130. This raises interesting questions: Do the other Gurage communities have any cog-
nizable interest or self-determination right in determining the members of the Gurage 
Nationality as a whole? And how does one determine who is Silte for purposes of the vote? 
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This process was immediately put into use. The House of the Fed-
eration adopted and promulgated the Council’s recommendation. The 
Silte council petitioned for recognition, the regional state conducted its 
study, and the Silte people voted for independent Nationality status. 
None of the parties appealed to the House of Federation for reconsidera-
tion of the result, so the matter was at last at a close. The Silte were 
recognized as a Nationality, received the related political benefits, and 
set up their own independent self-administration. The immediate dispute 
between the Silte, the Gurage and the regional government was resolved. 
Since then, other communities seeking recognition have done the 
same.131  
4. The Oromo: The Limits of the System 
The Oromo ruled Ethiopia and its many peoples for several centu-
ries, until they were superceded by the Amhara Nationality. Since then, 
the Oromo have been dominated by smaller ethnic groups, first the Am-
hara, and now the Tigreans. The Oromo Liberation Front (“OLF”) was a 
secondary player in the war against the communist Derg regime in the 
1970s and 1980s, which was eventually won by a coalition of ethnically 
defined militia dominated by the Tigrean military forces. In the post-war 
political process of developing the current government, the OLF felt it-
self shut out by the Tigrean political party. The OLF walked out of the 
constitution drafting process and has since refused to participate in elec-
tions.132  
The Oromo are now represented in the regional and federal govern-
ments by a new political party, which critics allege is a mere sham 
propped up by the Tigreans so as to be able to claim participation by all 
ethnic groups. The OLF is active as an opposition group operating in the 
sphere of protest and sometimes violence. It complains of political op-
pression and politically motivated arrests of Oromo, as well as pervasive 
social bias against them. The situation is volatile: there were demonstra-
tions, property destruction, and mass arrests of Oromo students at Addis 
Ababa University in January 2004 when the university refused permis-
sion for an on-campus Oromo cultural event.133  
Although the Ethiopian constitution provides for all recognized 
Nationalities like the Oromo to have the right to secede, the OLF has not 
instigated the political process for secession. Although the constitution 
also guarantees rights of equal treatment and self-government, the OLF 
                                                                                                                      
After all, self-identification is the whole of the issue at stake. See Proposed Decision, Silte 
case, supra note 129. 
 131. See Alemayahu June 6, 2002 Interview, supra note 26. 
 132. See generally Being and Becoming Oromo, supra note 37. 
 133. See Ethiopia: Rights Organization condemns arrests of Oromo students, supra note 
108; Hultin, supra note 47. 
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also has not brought its claims to the House of the Federation either for 
mediation or as constitutional claims.134 Rather, they have continued to 
protest outside the established ethnic conflict resolution process. 
5. Key Factors in the Berta, Silte and Oromo Cases 
Underlying the differences between the Berta, the Silte, and the 
Oromo’s experiences with the Ethiopian conflict resolution system are 
certain key factors that seem to have played a role in shaping those ex-
periences. In each case, both the nature of the dispute and the identity of 
the group affected the group’s perception of and reaction to the available 
dispute resolution mechanisms. And in each case, that reaction created 
dynamic relationships with broader effects beyond the resolution of the 
immediate dispute. 
There are two distinctive aspects to the nature of the disputes them-
selves. First, each dispute is embedded in complex, ongoing 
interrelationships, both amongst the ethnic groups themselves, and be-
tween those groups and the political and legal systems. Even when the 
dispute seemed initially to present a simple either/or question, the proc-
ess of dispute resolution peeled away that superficial dichotomy and 
exposed layers of legal and political concerns.135 In the Berta case, the 
initial question about proportional representation revealed underlying 
inequities and questions about rights to representation for non-
indigenous groups. In the Silte case, their demand to the regional state 
government for recognition revealed ambiguities in the substantive defi-
nition of a Nationality and the need for a process and criteria for 
addressing their demand. This revelatory effect complicates the task of 
bringing the immediate dispute to a conclusion, but raises the possibility 
that the process could have a fundamental effect on the relationship be-
tween the parties by providing a forum for addressing those underlying 
tensions. 
Second, while none of these disputes presents itself as a candidate 
for a simple solution, some are a better fit with the remedies available 
under this system than others. The Berta and Silte’s claims are for alloca-
tion of rights and benefits that are defined by the Ethiopian federal 
system and could be provided within it. In contrast, the OLF is challeng-
ing the underlying legitimacy of the system, including the House’s 
authority over dispute resolution.136  
                                                                                                                      
 134. See Alemayahu June 6, 2002 Interview, supra note 26. 
 135. See Carpenter & Kennedy, supra note 10, at 9.  
 136. The Berta and Silte’s claims are also clearly defined, and both sought specific 
remedies: the Berta wanted more regional representatives, and the Silte wanted recognition 
and self-government. The nature of the Oromo’s claims is not conducive to mediation or 
judgment by the House. Rather than having specific, limited claims and desired remedies, they 
have generalized claims of oppression, disenfranchisement and maltreatment. 
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These differences in the fit between the system and the claims af-
fected the groups’ participation in the conflict resolution system in 
several ways: by influencing their interest in participating in the system, 
by shaping how they expressed their claims, and by affecting the ability 
of the system to respond to those claims. The Berta and Silte, whose in-
terests corresponded to those recognized by the system, naturally had a 
greater interest in participating than the Oromo, whose interests fell out-
side the system. This in turn gave the Berta and the Silte an incentive to 
express their interests in the terms understood by the system. There were 
likely some underlying concerns that drove the Berta and Silte to seek 
greater political power, whether economic, reputational, cultural, or 
something else entirely. Enticed by the rewards for participating in the 
system, those various underlying concerns were transformed into claims 
for the legal rights recognized in the system: proportionate representa-
tion and formal recognition. The Berta and Silte then found the system 
generally, if imperfectly, responsive to their concerns: both groups’ 
claims were accepted into the system and considered by it. 
Next, not only the character of the disputes, but also the identity of 
the groups themselves affected their participation in the conflict resolu-
tion process. The first important characteristic is the group’s internal 
organization. Attempts to define group rights and pursue group claims 
are often plagued by problems of defining group membership and 
agency.137 The Berta and Silte are cohesive social groups with pre-
established members and leadership, minimizing these problems.138 The 
Oromo, in contrast, are a diffuse group without reliable internal leader-
ship structure or group consensus on the OLF’s cause. It would be 
difficult for the OLF to claim to represent the entire Oromo Nationality 
or to identify its actual members.139  
                                                                                                                      
 137. See generally James W. Nickel, Group Agency and Group Rights, in Ethnicity and 
Group Rights, supra note 11 (rebutting the criticism that ethnic minorities are deficient rights 
holders due to agency and membership ambiguities). 
 138. Although it is not clear whether this external presentation represents true internal 
group consensus, for purposes of participating in an external conflict resolution process as a 
group, the Berta and Silte were both able to muster a single, consistent group identity and 
position on the matter. 
 139. To participate effectively in a dispute resolution process, a group must be able to 
define representation on several levels: it must be able to define its membership, that is, who it 
represents, and it must designate agents to represent that membership. A group must also 
develop a reasonably cohesive position on the issues in dispute. If intra-group conflict cannot 
be resolved either before or during the dispute resolution process it will be impossible to 
implement a resolution. See Lawrence Susskind & Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: 
Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes 105–07 (1987). According to these 
criteria, the Silte, the Berta, and the Gumuz are well-organized as groups to participate in 
dispute resolution. Their membership and agency seem to have been well-established before 
the dispute arose, as they are discrete ethnic communities with clear leadership structures in 
place. Although it is impossible to be certain from public records and third-party reports, it 
appears that there is also a single group position on the claims they present, with no splinter 
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Of course, it is not by chance that the Berta and Silte do not suffer 
from the agency and membership problems that are common to group 
claims. Rather, just as the system’s recognition of certain rights has en-
couraged ethnic groups to shape their claims to match those rights, so 
the availability of opportunities for Nationalities to claim those rights 
has encouraged ethnic groups to establish internal leadership structures 
and processes that will permit them to do so. As small ethnic groups that 
gain disproportionately greater rewards by participating in the system, 
the Berta and Silte have greater incentives than the OLF to position 
themselves to do so. 
A second influential characteristic is each group’s level of involve-
ment in the political system as a whole. The conflict resolution system 
is, after all, not the only way that ethnic groups claim their rights. 
Rather, they claim them first and foremost through participation in gov-
ernment. And the success of political and structural incentives for 
participation in the government seems to reinforce participation in con-
flict resolution processes as well. Because the House is composed of 
representatives of the Nationalities, disputing Nationalities like the Berta 
and the Gumuz are already invested in the House as an institution, and it 
has responsibilities to them as its constituencies. The Silte, although not 
yet involved in the House, were seeking to be a part of it. In contrast, the 
OLF has refused to take part in the current government on principle and 
so not only has no pre-existing relationship with the House but is for-
mally opposed to it.140 This sense of constituency is a central theme in 
the structure of the Ethiopian system.  
Finally, the expressive function of bringing a claim to the House fa-
vors the participation of groups like the Berta and Silte rather than the 
                                                                                                                      
groups contesting the group’s position on the issue. In contrast, the Oromo are a diffuse 
community spread across several regional states, incorporating numerous smaller ethnic 
groups that identify to varying degrees with the larger group, and lacking definitive leadership 
structures. The Oromo as a people are not coalesced behind the OLF position, and it is not 
clear to what extent the OLF represent the views of the Oromo as a whole. Obviously, I am 
relying here on the available information in public records and the accounts of the decision 
makers involved in the process. The internal group processes may well be more complex than 
I indicate here, but there is in any event a clear contrast between the Berta, Silte and Gumuz’s 
ability to muster a cohesive group position for purposes of dispute resolution and the Oromo’s 
inability to do so. 
Representatives of Nationalities petitioning the House for enforcement of their rights to 
self-determination must now present evidence of agency and group consensus in the form of 
the signatures of 5% of the community, the official seal of the community administration if 
appropriate, and evidence of delegation. See HOF Proclamation, supra note 22, art. 21. 
 140. The Berta, Gumuz, Silte and Gurage have internal incentives to work with the sys-
tem because they obtain rights from it and have greater authority within the ethnic federalism 
system than they would under most others. They are all small groups who could otherwise not 
protect their sphere of self-government from other rival groups or play a significant role on 
the national stage. The Oromo, in contrast, believe they would have substantially more power 
if political power were allocated strictly in proportion to population.  
Spring 2004] Legal Process and Ethnic Conflicts 571 
 
Oromo. Parties may be looking not just for process or for resolution, but 
for the imprimatur of an outside authority or for a means of expressing 
the seriousness of their dispute. For small groups like the Berta and Silte 
to submit their local conflicts to the House symbolizes the dispute’s im-
portance and seeks the acknowledgment of a higher authority. These are 
satisfactions that the Oromo, a large group with a national conflict, can-
not expect. Since the federal government is the other party to their 
dispute, mere consideration of their claims by the House would serve as 
an expression of federal power rather than federal respect.  
Taken as a whole, these factors suggest that there is a dynamic rela-
tionship between the ethnic groups, the political system as a whole, and 
the conflict resolution system. There are certain qualities inherent in 
these conflicts and groups that make them more amenable to participa-
tion in and resolution by the conflict resolution system: a cohesive group 
position on an issue, for example, or a claim that fits neatly into the po-
litical structure as it exists. But the ethnic groups also engage in an 
active process of reshaping their identities and claims, when they see it 
to their advantage to do so in order to participate in the system.  
This also indicates that a conflict resolution system could be a tool 
for recasting ethnic interrelationships and roles in society, for the better 
or the worse. Whereas ethnic conflict may seem inchoate when it is un-
directed and takes place solely in social and political realms, the 
existence of a mechanism for resolving those conflicts to their advantage 
may encourage ethnic groups to narrow and hone their claims to specific 
concerns with specific remedies and to develop decision-making struc-
tures that will enable them to pursue those claims. That possibility raises 
important questions. Common wisdom has it that granting rights to eth-
nic groups may stir up more disputes or intensify old ones. Whether this 
is right or wrong, does granting access to process raise similar concerns?  
On a more hopeful note, if we assume that ethnic groups will con-
tinue to play social roles in ethnic-identified societies and that access to 
process might encourage them to play a productive rather than a destruc-
tive role, what kinds of roles would the state encourage them to take on? 
What sort of incentives will encourage them to accept those roles? And 
in the context of dispute resolution, what kinds of processes and institu-
tions will promote these goals? 
B. Exploring Legal Process Models 
The Ethiopian system provides one set of answers to these questions. 
It has three distinctive qualities: 1) it establishes a permanent conflict 
resolution institution that is composed of ethnic representatives and 
grants a measure of standing to all ethnic groups; 2) it uses complemen-
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tary consensual and adjudicative processes; and 3) it treats ethnic rela-
tionships as a primary subject of constitutional interpretation.  
Other states make use of some of these mechanisms and permit eth-
nic groups to participate in their court systems or other legal processes in 
limited ways. Some states have established permanent ombudsmen or 
commissions to address minority and indigenous concerns.141 Some per-
mit members of minority and indigenous groups to seek interpretation 
and enforcement of constitutional rights.142 The Ethiopian system, how-
ever, appears to be singular in combining all three qualities.  
However, the Ethiopian approach is distinctive in a more consequen-
tial sense than merely as a happenstance aggregation of these particular 
constituent parts. Other states may permit ethnic groups to make use of 
their legal processes when those groups can accommodate their identi-
ties and claims to those processes, by meeting the ordinary judicial 
system’s requirements for standing and jurisdiction.143 But ordinary judi-
cial procedures are designed primarily for individuals and for the state, 
not for groups, particularly in civil law systems.144 The Ethiopian system 
aims to design processes that accommodate the identities and claims of 
                                                                                                                      
 141. Australia, for example, has a commissioner for aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
social justice on its human rights commission. This commission investigates complaints 
against the government and makes recommendations concerning those complaints, but does 
not have jurisdiction over conflicts that do not relate to the government and does not have 
authority to carry out other conflict resolution processes. See Australian Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission Website, at http://www.humanrights.gov.au/social_justice/ 
index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
 142. Canada, for example, allows individual citizens who are members of English or 
French minority linguistic populations in their province to sue to enforce their right under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to have their children educated in that minority 
language. See Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, [2003] S.C.R. 62 (Can.). There are a number 
of relevant characteristics to this cause of action: at least in the Doucet-Boudreau case it is an 
individual, not a group, that has brought the claims; the cause of action appears to relate only 
to minority linguistic groups and not to all linguistic groups; and the right seems to be one 
solely vis-à-vis the government for provision of public funds and educational facilities, and 
does not provide for general conflict resolution processes in which other community members 
might have a say or other solutions to a conflict over the language of education might be 
sought. See id. 
 143. Although some states, such as the United States and India, are relatively open to 
public interest litigation on behalf of groups, most states’ judicial systems are not designed for 
such claims. Even where such litigation is possible, standing and jurisdiction often arise as 
difficult issues. In the U.S., for example, even when considering claims of discrimination on 
the basis of group characteristics such as race, the U.S. Supreme Court has made a point of 
emphasizing that the protected rights are held by individuals, not groups. See Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).  
 144. See Cappelletti, supra note 84, at 300 (“Traditionally, the role of the civil judge has 
been determined by the individualistic character and private content of civil litigation. . . . In 
the context of the new actions collectives or public interest actions, however, the traditional 
‘privatistic’ schemes are clearly inadequate.”) 
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its ethnic groups, by granting some standing to all groups and authoriz-
ing some jurisdiction over all disputes.145  
In so doing, the Ethiopian system challenges the usual assumptions 
and questions about the relationship of ethnic groups and legal process. 
Rather than asking whether ethnic groups can be rights holders or have 
the capacity to participate in legal process, it asks how legal process can 
be accommodated to the needs and conflicts of ethnic groups. Which 
qualities of legal process lend themselves to ethnic conflict resolution, 
and how can legal process be put to service of the goal of maintaining an 
ethnic-identified multi-ethnic society?  
1. Three Institutional Qualities: A Permanent, Ethnic-Composed 
Institution with Standing for Ethnic Groups 
The House of the Federation is a permanent institution that is com-
posed of ethnic representatives and grants standing to ethnic groups. 
These characteristics reflect and respond to the realities of ethnic conflict 
discussed in Part II, above. Accepting the inevitability of conflicts be-
tween ethnic groups, the Ethiopian government created a permanent 
conflict resolution system rather than relying on ad hoc interventions. 
Recognizing that the formally ethnic-blind ordinary courts in Ethiopia 
lack both the institutional capacity to handle any kind of group claims 
and the credibility to handle ethnic claims in particular, the House is fo-
cused specifically on resolving ethnic disputes and made up of ethnic 
representatives. By granting standing to all ethnic groups, the Ethiopian 
system makes legal processes available for all inter-ethnic disputes. In so 
doing, the Ethiopian system both acknowledges the complexity of 
Ethiopian inter-ethnic relationships and the need for processes that can 
address all ethnic groups’ claims, whether they are a local majority or 
minority.  
a. Permanence Offers Practical Advantages 
A permanent, specialized system presents certain typical advantages, 
and the Ethiopian system makes use of these advantages to address the 
realities of ethnic group conflicts. The House has the opportunity to de-
velop expertise and good practices over time, which is a benefit in the 
context of complex, interwoven ethnic relationships and disputes.146 A 
                                                                                                                      
 145. As discussed above, the ethnic groups and their disputes do not all fit neatly into 
the system, however. See discussion supra Part II.A.5. 
 146. In addition, because ethnic issues are the House’s primary concern and it is com-
posed of ethnic representatives, it has an actual and perceived interest primarily in the well-
being of ethnic groups rather than other potentially adverse constituencies such as individuals, 
government entities, or private organizations. Practically speaking, exclusivity means that 
ethnic conflicts will not have to compete for institutional resources with other conflicts and 
concerns. As discussed below, exclusivity also means that procedures can be designed for ease 
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permanent institution is positioned to address recurrent, pervasive social 
concerns over the long-term, by mandating and supervising the imple-
mentation of new processes or institutional reforms, for example.147 If 
controversies should arise in the future about the study and referendum 
process that the Council of Constitutional Inquiry established in the Silte 
case, the Council will be available to respond to those new issues.148 
In addition, the House is already constituted and organized, so that it 
should be readily available as disputes arise. Initiating a dispute resolu-
tion process requires some measure of political will and is sometimes 
seen as a loss of face or a signal of a weak relative bargaining position. 
Indeed, one aspect of training for mediators is the art of bringing reluc-
tant parties to the negotiating table. Triggering a pre-existing mechanism 
with an established institution is less controversial, requires less imagi-
nation and effort, and is therefore more likely to occur than calling for 
new ad hoc processes. The availability of a dispute resolution process 
can also provide an additional incentive to negotiate reasonably and 
peaceably outside that system, by posing the threat that the third party 
institution may bring the matter to a less advantageous solution than can 
be reached directly.149  
Furthermore, the existence of a permanent institution promotes not 
just participation, but early participation. Even after the parties do begin 
an ad hoc process, delays in beginning the process can be socially and 
politically costly and tend to make resolving the dispute more diffi-
cult.150 Easy cases now may well be hard cases later, after they have 
become contentious.151 And while lingering conflicts between private 
parties might not concern the state much, multi-ethnic states know that 
unaddressed inter-ethnic discord all too often festers into unrest.  
In this regard, early entry into the process also serves a diversionary 
purpose: by removing the dispute from its social and political context, its 
                                                                                                                      
of use by ethnic groups, unlike those of the ordinary court which are designed for individuals 
or for artificial entities such as businesses and do not easily accommodate claims by social 
groups. 
 147. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984). 
 148. If ethnic groups interacted only rarely so that a dispute between two groups truly 
was a one-time event without broader social ramifications, ad hoc processes might nonethe-
less suffice. But in the Ethiopian setting as in many others, groups are dealing with each other 
over the long-term and will inevitably face recurrent conflicts.  
 149. See Carpenter & Kennedy, supra note 10, at 224–26; Susskind & Cruikshank, su-
pra note 139, at 81–83. 
 150. See Carpenter & Kennedy, supra note 10, at 13 (noting the same phenomenon and 
describing the spiraling development of an unmanaged public conflict: “The . . . methods used 
by officials to involve the public may be out of phase with what is happening in the develop-
ing conflict. Public hearings can be too late and too adversarial to make a difference.”); 
Susskind & Cruikshank, supra note 139, at 91–94. 
 151. See Carpenter & Kennedy, supra note 10, at 16 (“Many [public] conflicts begin 
with a resolvable problem and grow beyond hope of resolution because they are not dealt with 
early.”) 
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social and political costs may be contained. Once a process for address-
ing their concerns had been initiated, both the Silte and the Berta 
permitted the involved local political institutions to carry on with their 
ordinary business instead of holding those institutions hostage to their 
dispute. The Oromo conflict, in contrast, is being played out in the socio-
political arena, with disruptive and sometimes violent results. 
b. Ethnic Composition Builds Ethnic Constituency 
It is common wisdom in Ethiopia, right or wrong, that the credibility 
of government institutions depends on having proportionate ethnic rep-
resentation within them. A demand for proportionate representation in 
every institution presents a heavy and at times unbearable burden that 
can undercut other institutional mandates. However, in institutions that 
address ethnic interests, proportionate representation may foster a vital 
sense of constituency among ethnic groups. The nurture of and reliance 
on a sense of ethnic constituency is one of the central themes of the 
Ethiopian system. 
In particular, ethnic representation in the House seems to promote 
both a general sense of constituency and also a practice of participating 
in the House as an institution. Because the Nationalities have 
representatives in the House and take part in its activities over the long-
term outside the context of any particular dispute, they have continuous 
access to, investment in and oversight of it. As discussed above, there is 
a dynamic relationship between the Nationalities and the political 
system: when given access to the system, Nationalities tend to shape 
their identities, internal organization, and claims to make use of that 
access to their advantage. Although it is impossible to pinpoint the 
motivation of the involved groups, in the Berta, Silte, and Oromo cases, 
political participation, or an interest in it, correlated with participation in 
conflict resolution, and vice versa.152  
If successful, the development of a sense of constituency in the 
House could have profound ramifications for the dispute resolution 
process. In any given dispute, it should encourage the involved Nation-
alities to bring their claims there. Over time, repeated individual acts of 
participation may establish a practice of resort to the House to resolve 
conflicts, and therefore a practice of using legal processes to resolve eth-
nic disputes. As discussed below, such practices may take on a life of 
their own, creating not just possibilities, but expectations of participa-
tion.153  
                                                                                                                      
 152. See discussion supra Part II.A.5. 
 153. Indeed, the House’s ethnic focus may even draw in reluctant ethnic leaders who 
might prefer to prolong conflicts. Disputes between ethnic groups often provide an occasion 
for political leaders to use ethnic rhetoric for political purposes, but it would be difficult for 
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In this sense, the creation of a permanent institution specifically in-
tended for ethnic conflicts could gradually reshape the social perception 
of ethnic conflict. If ethnic disputes are treated and resolved as ordinary 
disputes subject to rational procedures, they will eventually be regarded 
as such. The very existence of a permanent institution like the House of 
the Federation thus could undermine the social expectation that inter-
ethnic disputes will constitute pure exercises of power  
But while the permanence and ethnic composition of the House pre-
sent a transformative possibility, these qualities also run the risk of 
entrenching existing oppositions and hostilities. Particularly because 
constituency rather than independence is the basis of the institution’s 
credibility, it risks accreting institutional biases or becoming a pawn to 
powerful players and coalitions. The problems of reliance on constitu-
ency rather than independence are at their peak in the context of 
constitutional interpretation.  
The use of the House of the Federation, an ethnically representative 
body, to carry out the typically judicial role of constitutional interpreta-
tion underlines the high Ethiopian valuation of ethnic concerns in 
constitutional interpretation. It also relies again on a sense of constitu-
ency rather than an independent adjudicator to establish the process’s 
legitimacy among ethnic groups. However, in so doing, this choice 
blends legal and political roles in ways that threaten to undermine other 
fundamental goals of constitutional interpretation, such as maintaining 
separation of powers.  
As an initial matter, it is important to understand the place of the 
Ethiopian system in the range of methods of constitutional interpretation. 
Although Americans understand the essence of judicial review to be the 
power of the ordinary courts to interpret the constitution and to nullify 
laws as unconstitutional, this is not the shape of judicial review in many 
states.154 Ethiopia is unusual but by no means unique in giving the power 
of constitutional interpretation to the upper house of its Parliament.155 
                                                                                                                      
ethnic actors to ignore an institution like the House when conflicts arise, even if exacerbating 
those conflicts might be in their own interests. That being said, this quality is obviously not 
always effective, as the OLF has not taken this approach. 
 154. Indeed, some have argued that the American focus exclusively on review by the 
judiciary prevents other government actors and the public at large from taking part in the con-
struction and understanding of the American constitutional rights and framework. See, e.g., 
Mark Tushnet, Constitutionalism Without Courts?: Taking the Constitution Away from the 
Courts (1999) (adding a liberal voice to the conservative chorus arguing against the practice of 
exclusive judicial review). 
 155. As a historical matter, Ethiopia seems to have been drawing primarily from the 
constitutions of communist states such as the Soviet Union, China and North Korea, among 
others. See G. Harutyunyan & A. Mavčič , Constitutional Review and its Development in the 
Modern World (A Comparative Constitutional Analysis) 34 (1999); USSR Const. of 1977. 
This makes sense ideologically, since the revolutionary groups that overthrew the Derg were 
themselves socialist by ideology and were fighting for semi-autonomous regional self-
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Indeed, many states have a considerably more limited vision of the 
role of judicial review than does the United States. These states permit 
review only of certain kinds of constitutional claims under limited cir-
cumstances, relying to a large degree on political mechanisms to hold 
government power in check and enforce civil liberties.156 In general, 
states have authorized a wide range of institutions to interpret their con-
stitutions, and the scope of that authority varies significantly in terms of 
jurisdiction, power to nullify a law, binding effect of the judgment, and 
enforcement.157 For example, most states do provide for some form of 
                                                                                                                      
government rather than out of a love for capitalism. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 194–95, 
216–17. They were forced to abandon this ideology due to the untimely coincidence of their 
victory in 1991 with the fall of the Communist bloc.  
But while the formal structure of the Ethiopian system may be similar to that of commu-
nist governments of the past, its practice is not. The communist parliaments exercised this 
power only rarely or not at all, whereas the Ethiopian parliament is exercising it, and on con-
troversial and important issues. As of 2000, the Chinese legislative body with the authority to 
interpret the constitution had never done so. The Soviet system gave the right to interpret all 
laws (including the constitution) to the Supreme Soviet but also allowed the Supreme Court to 
interpret the laws in cases before it. However, the Constitution did not place any limits on the 
legislature’s power in any event. Furthermore, the judicial branch was not independent but 
rather answered to the legislative branch based on the philosophy of legislative supremacy as 
an expression of the people’s will. See Albert H.Y. Chen, The Interpretation of the Basic 
Law—Common Law and Mainland Chinese Perspectives, 30 H.K. L.J. 380, 409–13 (2000); 
see also discussion infra note 161.  
 156. See discussion infra notes 157 and 161. For a remarkably comprehensive summary 
and categorization of constitutional interpretation systems throughout the world, see Ha-
rutyunyan & Mavčič , supra note 155. 
 157. The variation in the structures and powers, formally and in practice, of bodies in-
terpreting the constitution is incredible. Harutyunyan & Mavčič, supra note 155, at 264–89. 
Among these alternatives are the following. Structurally, the body can be an ordinary court, a 
special court, legislative body, or council, or a special chamber or task force thereof. Id. at 
264. There may be a single body with authority to interpret the constitution, usually a single 
constitutional court, or there can be multiple bodies, such as the ordinary courts in the United 
States or multiple constitutional courts on different levels of government, as in Germany and 
Russia. Id. at 156–59. The members can be appointed or elected, for terms varying in practice 
from 6–15 years (with or without the possibility of reappointment or re-election) or for life. 
Id. at 264–65. Qualifications for membership vary: for example, while many states require 
members to be lawyers, others do not, including the United States, where the Constitution 
does not require Supreme Court Justices to be attorneys. Id. at 276–77.  
The jurisdiction of constitutional interpretation bodies also varies substantially, including 
(and excluding) all manner of laws, regulations, rules, treaties, official and unofficial acts, acts 
of private and public actors, elections, referenda, and so on. Id. at 286. In light of the linguis-
tic/ethnically defined federalist system in Switzerland, it is interesting to note that “[t]he 
Federal Court exercises its constitutional jurisdiction chiefly with respect to legislative acts 
and decisions issued by the Cantons,” while “[t]he only federal legislative decisions subject to 
constitutional review are issued by the Federal Executive (Federal Council).” Id. at 155. All 
other federal laws and acts are subject only to political review. In some states, such as France, 
the review body exercises solely preventative review of an act or law for constitutionality 
before it is enacted, while in others, the body can exercise repressive review after an act has 
been taken or a law has been passed. Id. at 265. If the body finds the law or act unconstitu-
tional after it is already in force, the decision could be either declaratory/advisory or effective 
and binding. If binding, the decision can take effect ex tunc, annulling the law or act retro-
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judicial review, putting the power to interpret the constitution and nullify 
some contradictory government actions in the hands of some independ-
ent judicial or quasi-judicial body.158 But only about one-third of those 
states follow the United States in decentralizing this authority to the or-
dinary courts as a whole. The others vest the interpretative power in a 
special constitutional court or council, vest it solely in the highest ordi-
nary court of the land, or use some mixture of these systems.159 Only a 
few states do not provide for authoritative constitutional interpretation at 
all.160  
But even when considered within the context of this variety of roles 
and institutional mechanisms for constitutional interpretation, the Ethio-
pian choice of the House as its constitutional interpreter raises a red flag 
about political control of the process. At times, assigning this authority 
to a non-judicial branch has been a signal of a repressive government 
disinterested in active review. While there are a number of democratic, 
stable, and rights-respectful nations that operate under a system of par-
liamentary interpretation of the constitution, those nations tend to have 
other internal incentives for voluntary adherence to the constitution that 
Ethiopia lacks.161  
                                                                                                                      
spectively from the time of its initial adoption, or ex nunc, annulling the law or act prospec-
tively from the time of the ruling. Id. at 274.  
Finally, there is substantial variation in the procedure by which a constitutional interpre-
tation issue can be brought before the review body. Standing can be limited to certain 
government bodies, such as the courts and legislature or an ombudsman, or a petition can be 
brought by private individuals or entities. Id. at 287. The body’s deliberations may be public 
or private, and internal procedures also vary. Id. at 264–65.  
 158. Harutyunyan and Mavčič account for approximately 170 states, of which approxi-
mately 145 vest authority in a judicial or quasi-judicial body. Harutyunyan & Mavčič , supra 
note 155, at 29–34. 
 159. Roughly 50 states follow the U.S. model, including nine states in Africa, whereas 
approximately 80 vest authority in a constitutional court or council or in the highest national 
court, and roughly 15 apply some sort of mixed system. See Harutyunyan & Mavčič , supra 
note 155, at 29–34. I use the phrase “follow the U.S.” advisedly as an expression of the his-
torical development of this system from its origin in the United States in Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. 137 (1803) to its subsequent consideration and adoption by other states. 
 160. For example, the Netherlands does not authorize any body to perform constitutional 
review, except for Supreme Court review of certain European Community issues. However, 
the Netherlands stands out in this group as being relatively stable and concerned with human 
rights. Liberia, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Congo are more representative of the group 
as a whole. See Harutyunyan & Mavčič , supra note 155, at 34. 
 161. Finland and the United Kingdom are examples. See Aulis Aarnio, Statutory Inter-
pretation in Finland, in Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study 123, 150 (D. Neil 
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991); Ariel L. Bendor & Zeev Segal, Constitution-
alism and Trust in Britain: An Ancient Constitutional Culture, A New Judicial Review Model, 
17 Am. Univ. Int’l L. Rev. 683 (2002). The judiciary is beginning to play a greater role in 
enforcing human rights norms in the United Kingdom as a result of its involvement in the 
European Union. But until that development, the U.K. had used Parliament itself to review 
and check its own and other government actions by exercising self-restraint and by defining 
and enforcing an unwritten constitution, the fundamental traditions and norms that have been 
established over generations. However, this self-restraint and quasi-constitutional judging and 
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In the Ethiopian case, this decision prioritizes the credibility created 
by a sense of ethnic constituency over the legitimacy and check on the 
political branches made possible by having an independent, nonpolitical 
body interpret the constitution. For reasons of sheer numbers if nothing 
else, it would not be possible to have representatives of all ethnic groups 
among the members of a constitutional court, whereas the House is 
composed of representatives of all the Nationalities.162 If it is true that 
Ethiopia’s ethnic groups would not accept constitutional determinations 
that came from a non-representative body, then the credibility of those 
determinations among ethnic groups is better guaranteed by ensuring 
constituency than independence. The costs of this trade-off are more 
acute, of course, in cases that do not affect ethnic interests, and so this 
trade-off also represents a judgment that ethnic issues will be a primary 
concern of constitutional interpretation.163  
There is no doubt, however, that the decision to vest the power of 
constitutional interpretation in a political body does not sit easily with 
respect for the values promoted by separation of powers and systems of 
strong judicial review. Ethnic issues are only a few of those that must be 
addressed by constitutional interpretation, and active, independent con-
stitutional courts have played a vital role in building respect for 
constitutional values in new democracies as well as old.164 In light of 
these concerns, ethnic constituency building ought not take precedence 
over independent adjudication where constitutional interpretation is con-
cerned. Furthermore, as discussed below, processes for ethnic conflict 
resolution may be more effective generally if they are based in multiple 
institutions, rather than in a single, ethnic-focused system.165 
                                                                                                                      
enforcement depends upon a set of social expectations and mechanisms that Ethiopia does not 
share, such as common, long-standing social norms, an active press, and a forceful court of 
public opinion. See Bendor & Segal, supra; see also discussion supra note 155. 
 162. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 163. Two other factors mitigate the risk of politicization. While the House of the Federa-
tion is part of the Parliament, it does not legislate, so that there is a division of the legislative 
and interpretive functions. And while the House has the final authority over any constitutional 
decision, the Council of Constitutional Interpretation, a legal body, does the work of interpre-
tation.  
Unfortunately, the Council also lacks basic structural guarantees of independence. See 
Harutyunyan & Mavčič , supra note 155, at 217–35. The Council does not have any funding 
guarantees or independent sources of funding. See CCI Proclamation, supra note 22, arts. 33–
34. While the Council’s powers are in principle quite broad, see id. arts. 6, 17, 21–22, its deci-
sions are advisory and it has no powers of enforcement. See id. arts. 6, 27, 35. Council 
members have no immunities and can be removed “for good cause,” except for the Chairper-
son and Deputy Chairperson who are protected only by virtue of their positions on the Federal 
Supreme Court. Id. art. 8. And while the Council’s implementing legislation calls for it to act 
transparently, in my experience it does not hold public hearings, nor does it release its deci-
sions to the public. See CCI Proclamation, supra note 22, art. 29.  
 164. See Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies (2003).  
 165. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
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c. Risks and Rewards of Standing for Ethnic Groups 
While the House grants standing to its Nationalities to bring quite a 
number of claims, its recognition of ethnic groups is not unqualified. 
Although Nationalities can be parties to virtually any claim, it is far eas-
ier for government entities to initiate a claim quickly than for a 
Nationality to do so. Under the new law organizing the House’s proce-
dures, regional state councils are automatically accepted as proper 
representatives of the state’s interests, but Nationalities must prove 
agency and also must demonstrate that they have exhausted state remedies 
for their claims. While this is likely a wise safeguard against some forms 
of chicanery, it does place an additional burden on Nationalities and com-
plicate the process of bringing claims for them. In addition, Nationalities 
can bring only those constitutional claims that relate to their constitutional 
rights, while states can petition for hearing of any constitutional claim. 
Since regional state councils tend to be dominated by the majority ethnic 
group in the region, these rules in fact give systematic advantages to re-
gional majorities (acting as regional states), over regional minorities 
(who participate as Nationalities). Finally, while the House has heard 
claims affecting communities that have not been recognized as Nation-
alities, as it did in the Silte case, its new procedural law does not provide 
a specific mechanism for such communities to bring claims.166 
Thus, while the kind of institution embodied by the House in theory 
could serve as a venue of first resort for ethnic groups in conflict, in fact 
the House’s rules of admissibility, standing, and exhaustion mean that it 
serves as a venue of last resort, after other mechanisms have been tried 
and have failed. These limits on ethnic standing undercut the benefits 
promoted by the House’s permanence and ethnic composition to some 
extent. The House presents a venue for most ethnic claims eventually, 
after exhaustion requirements are satisfied and so long as a regional state 
will bring those claims that a Nationality or smaller community is not 
specifically authorized to bring. However, it does not offer automatic, 
immediate access to legal process for all claims. Accordingly, it is less 
likely that ethnic groups will develop a practice or expectation of mak-
ing use of the House’s processes to resolve their conflicts, and less likely 
that the House will be able to intervene early in a conflict and prevent it 
from escalating. 
These questions of the appropriate standards for ethnic group stand-
ing and admissibility of ethnic claims, however, beg a more fundamental 
question: whether it is ever wise to give official recognition to ethnic 
groups or to design legal processes specifically for resolving ethnic dis-
putes. This question is particularly acute in the constitutional setting, as 
                                                                                                                      
 166. See HOF Proclamation, supra note 22; CCI Proclamation, supra note 22. 
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discussed in the next Section, but it presents concerns even in consensual 
and ordinary adjudicative proceedings. 
It is worth noting again at this juncture that many multi-ethnic states 
will not find it in their interests to make use of legal processes for resolv-
ing ethnic disputes. Rather, there is a subset of multi-ethnic states that 
have an obvious need for some form of ethnic conflict resolution: that is, 
multi-ethnic states where ethnic identity is primary, ethnic division is 
deep, and recurrent debilitating ethnic disputes pose the primary threat to 
the existence of the state.  
In considering whether it is appropriate to grant some form of stand-
ing to ethnic groups, it is also important to consider that state recognition 
of ethnicity poses a risk for ethnic groups as well as for the state. In the 
past, such recognition has been limited and often negative. To be sure, 
some constitutions contain protections for ethnic minority or indigenous 
groups, either in the form of group rights, protections against discrimina-
tion on the basis of ethnicity, or political structures such as autonomous 
regions or set aside parliamentary seats.167 But other constitutions have 
enshrined limits on citizenship that have been either obliquely or overtly 
based on ethnicity, and many have not addressed ethnicity at all.168 Po-
                                                                                                                      
 167. See, e.g., Hung. Const. arts. 68, 70A; India Const. arts. 29–30, 330–35; Uganda 
Const. art. 36. As the disfavored position of minority and indigenous groups came to interna-
tional attention after World War I, states began to ratify treaties protecting those groups, and 
then eventually to guarantee minority or indigenous rights in their constitutions as well. See 
Elizabeth F. Defeis, Minority Protections and Bilateral Agreements: An Effective Mechanism, 
22 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 291 (1999); Wilson, supra note 62, at 465–72; Istvan Pogany, 
Accommodating an Emergent National Identity: The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe, in 
Accommodating National Identity, supra note 15, at 175, 185–86. 
These protections are exceptional in nature: they guarantee rights for certain ethnic 
groups in contrast to a civic whole, and not for all ethnic groups. See generally Kymlicka, 
supra note 58, at 26–33. These rights are also of limited scope and purpose: they protect cer-
tain cultural rights, guarantee equal treatment under the law, provide for political 
representation, and some offer circumscribed rights of self-government or self-determination. 
For example, the Pakistani constitution specifically protects minorities’ religious, cultural, and 
equality rights. See Pak. Const. pmbl.; Shaheen Saradar Ali, The Rights of Ethnic Minorities in 
Pakistan: A Legal Analysis (with particular reference to the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas), in Accommodating National Identity, supra note 15, at 189, 193. The new Slovak 
constitution guarantees members of minority groups the right to be educated in their own 
languages. See Eric Stein, Out of the Ashes of a Federation, Two New Constitutions, 45 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 45, 53 (1997). Finally, these rights are often dedicated to and enforceable by indi-
viduals rather than by the group collectively. See Wilson, supra note 62, at 466–67; 
Aukerman, supra note 1, at 1031; Stein, supra, at 53. Such constitutions therefore express a 
limited vision of the proper constitutional role of ethnicity: ethnic identity belongs only to the 
minority and only to the oppressed, and ethnic identity is recognized by the constitution only 
for the purpose of alleviating that oppression.  
 168. For example, the constitutions of the two constituent entities of Bosnia and Herze-
govina had provisions that limited citizenship according to ethnicity until those provisions 
were struck down by the Constitutional Court in 2000. See Case U 5/98, Request for Evalua-
tion of Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Constitution of Republika Srpska and the 
Constitution of the Federation of BiH, Partial Decision (Constitutional Ct. Bosn. & Herze. 
July 1, 2000), available at http://ccbh.ba/decisions (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). By contrast, 
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litical policies targeted at ethnic groups are far more common, some-
times protecting minority and indigenous peoples, but sometimes 
targeting particular groups for sanction or oppression.169 There is no 
doubt that state recognition of ethnicity has often been to the detriment 
of ethnic groups in the past, and that, whatever its ostensible purpose, 
such recognition creates risk of misuse.  
Acknowledging the legitimacy of these concerns, two observations 
suggest that some multi-ethnic states should nonetheless run the risks 
associated with legitimizing ethnic identifications in order to gain the 
benefit of legal process for ethnic conflict resolution. First, if an ethnic 
conflict exists, whether sham or genuine, the multi-ethnic state’s fears 
have already been realized: ethnicity has become a source of conflict. 
While there is a risk that recognition of ethnic groups may catalyze an 
escalation in ethno-political rhetoric, it is certain that the state must find 
some way of dealing with ethnic conflict in order to survive. In this con-
text, recognizing ethnic groups as parties for the purpose of adopting 
conflict resolution processes may present a measured risk that is worth 
taking.170  
Furthermore, it appears that it is not so much ethnic identification it-
self as unresolved and festering ethnic disputes that pose an imminent 
threat to the multi-ethnic state. One reason that ethnic identification is 
persistent is that ethnicity often serves a positive purpose by constructing 
                                                                                                                      
early constitutions dealt with ethnic groups only obliquely, even when key aspects of political 
life such as citizenship were determined in part by ethnicity. The U.S. Constitution does not 
refer to ethnic groups directly in spite of the variety of ethnic groups that made up the Ameri-
can polity at that time. Its only express references to ethnic groups are its provisions 
concerning the Indian Tribes, which it treats more as a set of particularly relevant foreign 
nations than as ethnicities, see U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.  
 169. Multi-ethnic states have long been riddled with ethnic categories and compromises 
below the constitutional surface. In the United States, treaties and other political agreements 
promised certain rights to indigenous groups at the time that they were incorporated into the 
United States. Of course, these promises were not always fulfilled. See Kymlicka, supra note 
58, at 12. Of course, often political or legal recognition of ethnicity has been for the purpose 
of facilitating stigmatization and discrimination rather than benefits. In the early twentieth 
century, public outrage in San Francisco over the “Yellow Peril” posed by increasing numbers 
of Japanese immigrants led to riots and school segregation orders and were eventually re-
solved with a federal Immigration Act and a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Japan limiting 
immigration to the U.S. by Japanese citizens. See Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex 482–84, 
492–93, 510 (2001) (Morris views this as more of a labor conflict than an ethnic or racial 
conflict but acknowledges the ethnic nature of the targeting).  
Political and legal recognition of ethnicity has often been catalyzed by ethnic conflict, ei-
ther resolving it, or causing it, or both. Eastern Europe has had a complex history of ethnic 
conquest and accommodation, assimilation and repression for hundreds of years before its 
current travails. Multi-ethnic states were created through political compromises and military 
victories, and then divided into single ethnicity states again when fortunes shifted. Ethnic 
minorities within these changing states often have been subject to discriminatory laws and 
policies. See Pogany, supra note 167, at 176–77.  
 170. Indeed, the very existence of legal processes may have an ameliorating effect by 
undermining rhetoric alleging that ethnic discord is intractable.  
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vibrant, valued communities. Beyond their cultural and social value, 
these communities may play a positive political role, governing them-
selves successfully and authentically representing the interests of their 
members. Indeed, they may be more popular, credible, and effective than 
non-ethnic political institutions. Nor is it even the development of dis-
putes between ethnic groups that makes ethnic conflict destructive. After 
all, disagreements readily and ordinarily arise and are resolved just as 
readily and ordinarily between and within all communities, however de-
fined.171  
Rather, the primary threats that ethnic conflict poses to the state 
seems to be twofold: the use of ethnicity by political or community lead-
ers to stir up conflict as a means to power, and the failure to resolve 
inter-ethnic conflicts, whether genuine or political shams, in an orderly 
and peaceful way. The first threat is one that legal process can address 
only indirectly, by undermining political rhetoric asserting that there is 
no effective remedy for ethnic conflict, and by actually resolving claims.  
The second threat presented by ethnic conflict, that of unrest spurred 
by lingering unresolved conflict, is one that can and ought to be ad-
dressed directly by law and legal process. Where ethnic conflict is 
already occurring, early diversion of the disagreement into a conflict 
resolution process before it becomes intractable offers some hope of pre-
venting the dispute from escalating. Granting standing to ethnic actors 
and recognizing their claims is necessary to this process.172  
Mere acknowledgment of ethnic identifications in the conflict reso-
lution context, without more (such as creation of new political rights or 
mandatory identification of all citizens with a particular ethnic group, for 
example), ought to pose a relatively small risk of catalyzing ethnic con-
flict, as compared to acknowledgment of ethnic identifications in other 
contexts. However, there is a specific risk to legitimizing legal institu-
tions as an appropriate venue, and legal processes as an appropriate 
mechanism, for ethnic dispute resolution. Just as democratic processes 
have been co-opted by political and community ethnic leaders and used 
as tools of nationalism and ethnic warfare, so too could legal proc-
esses.173  
This raises several questions: Does ethnicity pose a risk that is 
greater or different in kind than other political interests that have been 
known to hijack legal processes? What safeguards might be established 
against misuse of the legal system for this purpose, as structural guaran-
                                                                                                                      
 171. See discussion of the complexity of ethnic identifications and conflicts supra sec-
tion II.A. 
 172. See Susskind & Cruikshank, supra note 139, at 94. 
 173. See discussion supra section II.B. 
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tees of judicial independence protect against misuse of the courts by the 
political branches of government? 
d. Institutional Possibilities 
The Ethiopian system calls on us to turn from the abstract to the ac-
tual in considering these questions. If we take seriously the possibility 
that legal processes might be effective in addressing some ethnic dis-
putes, what form of standing should ethnic groups be given, and what 
kind of institution might best resolve ethnic claims, while mitigating the 
risks posed by legitimizing ethnic actors? The answer provided to this 
problem by the Ethiopian system is a permanent, ethnic-focused institu-
tion with standing for all ethnic groups. 
While this approach has its advantages, as discussed above, it also 
presents certain concerns. Permanent institutions can build up permanent 
biases. In the ordinary courts, strict formalities of procedure and provi-
sions for review, as well as the limits of the substantive law, are intended 
to mitigate this problem. As discussed below, the Ethiopian system lacks 
such formalities and works primarily from constitutional provisions, 
without much additional substantive law on ethnic issues. Without ade-
quate provisions for independence, conflict resolution institutions may 
become mere puppets of the government’s ethnic policy. In the Ethio-
pian context, the House has no safeguards for independent action such as 
those that commonly are used to protect the independence of the ordi-
nary judiciary.  
Furthermore, shunting ethnic claims off to special courts or other in-
stitutions may merely relegate them to a second class system rather than 
providing them a more effective one. In a resource-poor country, there is 
no guarantee that ethnic conflict resolution institutions will be more ca-
pable than judicial ones. In the Ethiopian case, the House has been 
plagued by insufficient resources and concomitant delays that have un-
dercut its initial successes in persuading ethnic groups to participate in 
the system and threaten ultimately to undermine its credibility. There is 
also the risk of institutional bad faith: in the past, ethnic and tribal courts 
have been the mark of colonial governments intent on subjugation and 
differentiation.174 Whether because of political bad faith, internal bias or 
simple lack of funds, a separate system, well designed in principle, may 
prove inadequate in practice. 
Finally, creating an entirely new system especially for ethnic conflict 
may be well beyond what an ethnic-identified state has the resources, 
political will, or inclination to undertake. States that are already in a pe-
                                                                                                                      
 174. Separate courts for indigenous groups were a mark of the apartheid regime in South 
Africa, for example. See Hallie Ludsin, Cultural Denial: What South Africa’s Treatment of 
Witchcraft Says For the Future of its Customary Law, 21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 62, 67 (2003).  
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riod of transition may have an interest in considering new state struc-
tures, and those facing severe ethnic conflicts may be willing to go to 
great lengths in order to address those conflicts. Many ethnic-identified 
states, however, might be willing to tinker with, but not to reorganize, 
their current legal processes. 
The Ethiopian institutional structure presents an interesting experi-
ment that should prod us to consider how legal processes could be 
shaped to address ethnic claims, rather than offering a blueprint for re-
solving ethnic conflict. Taking seriously the Ethiopian approach of 
offering processes designed for ethnic groups rather than the other way 
around, there are a variety of ways that a state might try to do so without 
adopting the Ethiopian institutional structure.  
One possibility would be to have a permanent conflict resolution 
system but not permanent standing for ethnic groups. Rather, ethnic 
groups, like classes in class actions, might be required to demonstrate 
agency and representation on a case-by-case basis. This might help pre-
vent the entrenchment of ethnic identities and of dominant viewpoints 
within ethnic groups and might spur intra-group debate on public issues.  
Another possibility would be to create a venue that is designated ex-
clusively for group claims, but not specifically for ethnic ones. This 
approach would permit the use of procedures that are aimed at groups 
rather than individuals and of mediators and judges who are accustomed 
to addressing public disputes rather than private ones, while mitigating 
the risk of creating a second class ethnic system or entrenching ethnic 
identities. This would also be more productive than a specifically ethnic 
system in states where group conflicts are not defined primarily along 
ethnic lines but as often occur between religious, linguistic, or other 
groups. 
Yet another possibility would be to adopt processes that open the or-
dinary courts to ethnic groups’ claims. In spite of the disadvantages of 
using the ordinary court system for group claims concerning matters of 
public interest, particularly in civil law systems, this solution would 
avoid the problem of shunting ethnic groups to a separate court system, 
would treat ethnic group claims like other legal claims, and would pro-
vide the safeguards of established formal procedures and institutions.175  
At the other extreme, a state might decide to rely on purely political 
processes created on a case-by-case basis as the only way to properly 
tailor processes, avoid the development of biases, and prevent the use of 
the system as a tool of the government. While this would mean the loss 
of the advantages of expertise and prompt availability that are created by 
a permanent system, these losses could be mitigated by a political com-
mitment to identify and address ethnic disputes in early stages.  
                                                                                                                      
 175. See discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
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Finally, as discussed below, legal process and conflict resolution 
theories suggest procedural mechanisms for mitigating the problems 
raised by a permanent ethnic-focused system.176  
Depending on the state’s legal system, resources and ethnic relation-
ships, one of these options might prove more productive than permanent, 
ethnic-oriented institutions. What is vital is that the state provide some 
venue, and one that is carefully chosen, for addressing ethnic conflicts. 
2. Complementary Consensual and Adjudicative Methods 
Because ethnic groups and their disputes are so varied, it would be 
too much to expect that a single legal process would be effective for all 
ethnic disputes. Disputes that are based in legally defined rights may be 
susceptible of adjudication in ordinary courts, but many ethnic disputes 
are not based in legal rights. Some issues may be readily negotiated 
while others affect vital group interests, and some groups are amenable 
to compromise while others have a contentious relationship that will not 
permit voluntary resolution of their disagreements. Furthermore, while 
some cases may concern only the immediate parties to the dispute, oth-
ers have broader implications for the nation as a whole.  
While legal processes do not come in as many varieties as ethnic 
conflicts, there are many different modes of legal process for ethnic-
identified states to consider. Although we tend to think of legal process 
primarily in terms of litigation before a court, alternative dispute resolu-
tion (“ADR”) methods have become an integral part of the everyday 
workings of legal systems. A single claim may make its way through all 
kinds of legal process, from mediation to litigation to a negotiated set-
tlement, for example, or from arbitration to judicial review of the 
arbitrator’s decision. This shift in practice has also shifted the ordinary 
understanding of legal process to encompass arbitration, mediation, and 
other forms of consensual dispute resolution as well as adversarial and 
adjudicative mechanisms. In addition, in ethnic-identified countries like 
Ethiopia, there are often rich legal traditions within ethnic groups that 
might be employed fruitfully.177 
The Ethiopian example suggests that using complementary proc-
esses may be more effective for the immediate purpose of resolving 
disputes than a single system. It also indicates that, at least in some in-
                                                                                                                      
 176. See discussion infra Section III.B.2. 
 177. Indeed, traditional Ethiopian modes of private and public litigation are a fascinating 
subject in themselves. See Jembere, supra note 90, at 187–216. The House of the Federation’s 
mandate requires it to incorporate traditional dispute resolution systems as appropriate. See 
HOF Proclamation, supra note 22, art. 33. To my knowledge, no formal steps have been taken 
to study traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, but the House has made use of local prac-
tices, such as reliance on councils of elders, in mediating particular disputes. See Alemayehu 
June 6, 2002 Interview, supra note 26. 
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stances, legal processes may play a transformative social role. This 
transformative potential, however, also heightens the risks associated 
with misuse of the system by parties acting in bad faith, and so we also 
must consider how to mitigate those risks,. 
a. Effectiveness in Dispute Resolution 
By using both consensual and adjudicative processes ranging from 
informal negotiations to authoritative constitutional interpretation, the 
Ethiopian system aspires to combine several legal processes into a com-
prehensive whole that can effectively address many ethnic concerns. 
However, it does not achieve this goal in practice. According to its con-
stitutional mandate, the mediation process ought to permit consideration 
of claims such as the Berta’s that are not based in legally enforceable 
rights and obligations,178 or even of other, more diffuse concerns such as 
repeated verbal or physical quarrels between members of the groups. 
The non-constitutional adjudicative component should provide an effec-
tive backstop to the risk of an impasse in mediation. Through 
constitutional interpretation, the House can define a legal framework of 
constitutional rights to provide a baseline for future negotiations and 
create a process for implementing rights, like the Silte’s referendum pro-
cedure. 
In theory, those processes could complement and balance each other, 
but in reality, the Ethiopian system fails to take advantage of each 
process’s potential strengths. The informal, consensus-building aspects 
of a mediation process tend to be most effective if there are low barriers 
to entry into the system, so that parties will tend to initiate the process 
early, before positions have hardened and the dispute has become 
intractable. While a permanent institution presents the opportunity for 
early intervention in disputes, as discussed above, the Ethiopian system’s 
requirement that local processes be exhausted means that a dispute will 
not come to the House until it is at a deadlock.179  
The weakness of the House’s adjudication system presents a serious 
gap in the system’s comprehensiveness and effectiveness. While media-
tion and other consensual procedures may benefit from flexible 
procedures due to their reliance on the agreement of the parties for deci-
sion, adjudication processes that impose decisions depend on the use of 
established procedures and rules to ensure fair, non-arbitrary decision-
making. However, the law establishing the House’s authority does not 
                                                                                                                      
 178. Although the election process is defined by law, no cause of action exists for the 
Berta to bring their challenge to court.  
 179. With more resources, the process could be made more accessible in practice. Lim-
ited staff and funds mean that the States’ Committee cannot immediately and effectively 
respond to every concern that is brought to them and therefore has no incentive to promote 
greater accessibility. See Megiso Interview, supra note 24. 
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define the processes of adjudication except in the most general terms. In 
the Berta case, without an established process to move the matter ahead, 
resort to adjudication seems to have meant merely a continuation of the 
impasse.180  
Furthermore, creating adjudicative procedures in the context of on-
going disputes is not only inefficient, but is also likely to impair the 
effectiveness of the institution and presents a serious risk of undermining 
its legitimacy. As discussed below, any system of ethnic dispute resolu-
tion must carefully take account of and try to countermand the likelihood 
of bad faith on the part of at least some participants in the system. The 
lack of procedures leaves the adjudicative process open to misuse.  
On a positive note, the House’s constitutional decision in the Silte 
case represented a step toward the end of creating additional processes to 
address recurrent concerns. Here, the House created a multi-stage 
process for determining a community’s identity that blends legal and 
political, consensual and adjudicative mechanisms and multiple levels of 
government. As the process progresses, it moves from the most local, 
political and consensual processes, votes by the community’s council 
and by the community itself, to the second stage, a hybrid political-legal 
study and adjudication at the regional level. If that adjudication is not 
accepted by the parties, the final step is the most national, legal, and 
adjudicative process, a possible appeal to the House for constitutional 
interpretation.  
The results in the Berta and Silte cases suggest that different proc-
esses do have different strengths and weaknesses, of which a successful 
conflict resolution system should take account. However, while estab-
lishing a single system making use of complementary processes may 
present a theoretical ideal, to do so will require a significant influx of 
resources and exercise of political will. For states lacking both, second-
best options may present a more successful alternative.  
b. Generating Legal Norms and Practices 
If the ability to bring disputes to some sort of conclusion provides 
the measure of success, using multiple and complementary processes 
                                                                                                                      
 180. Some of the issues uncovered in the mediation process in the Berta case, such as 
questions of what constitutes proportionate representation and the rights of non-indigenous 
peoples to representation, may be susceptible of constitutional interpretation. But to the extent 
that the obstacle is a simple refusal to accept the results of the States’ Committee’s study, or 
the need to resolve other non-constitutional issues such as allocation of agreed upon rights, 
constitutional interpretation will offer no redress. An effective, defined non-constitutional 
adjudicative process, such as a form of arbitration or litigation, would provide a venue for 
deciding such non-constitutional legal and political issues. In addition, adjudicative and con-
sensual processes can be blended in various ways to fit the circumstances. Examples include 
structured negotiations and nonbinding arbitrations. See Leonard L. Riskin & James E. West-
brook, Dispute Resolution and Lawyers 3–4 (2d ed. 1997).  
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seems to provide an advantage. In light of the serious social and political 
ramifications of unresolved ethnic disputes, this is no small matter. But 
there are other considerations: equality, efficiency, fairness, enforceabil-
ity and credibility among them.181  
Precisely because ethnic groups do play such a significant role in 
ethnic-identified societies, the social effects of these processes are a vital 
concern for the state. As discussed below, the Ethiopian system on its 
face promotes a particular social goal: self-determination for its ethnic 
groups. Certainly the results of the constitutional interpretation in the 
Silte case seem to advance this purpose. However, as discussed below, 
other multi-ethnic states will likely have other predominant concerns, 
such as security and equality among their ethnic groups, and so their 
practices will need to be guided by and judged against different norms. 
There is a lively debate about the essential social purpose and func-
tioning of legal processes, spurred not only by the infiltration of ADR 
into legal systems, but also by the social effects of public interest litiga-
tion and by the critical legal studies movement. Division on these 
questions is particularly acute when it comes to questions like the one 
before us: the appropriate processes and institutions for deciding group 
disputes of public significance. The discussion began with opposing 
principles. Owen Fiss and other advocates of litigation before a judge 
promoted authoritative adjudication based on external, neutral legal prin-
ciples as a potent agent of institutional and social change, and 
emphasized the importance of formal procedures as a protection for 
weaker parties.182 Advocates of consensual systems, in contrast, con-
tended that the parties themselves can better create durable solutions that 
promote their primary, often underlying goals, and that their direct, ac-
tive participation in self-defined processes is crucial to this end.183 
Critical legal scholars, meanwhile, saw in both systems flawed assump-
tions of neutrality and equality that merely mask the use of law as a 
vehicle for power.184 
As this debate has progressed, new approaches and theories have 
emerged. A middle ground has developed, based on the proposition that 
different processes will have roles to play in serving different sorts of 
disputes, and that relevant factors can be identified to provide models for 
                                                                                                                      
 181. Consideration of these and other values would be a worthwhile endeavor, but one 
well beyond the scope of this Article. See Paths to Justice: Major Public Policy Issues of Dis-
pute Resolution, Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Dispute Resolution and Public Policy, 
National Institute for Dispute Resolution (1983), in Riskin & Westbrook, supra note 180 (de-
veloping these criteria). 
 182. See Fiss, supra note 147. 
 183. See Andrew McThenia & Thomas Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 Yale L.J. 1660 
(1985); Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 Yale L.J. 1669 (1985) (responding to McThenia & 
Shaffer); Susskind & Cruikshank supra note 139, at 26–32, 77. 
 184. See Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism 82–88 (1996). 
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choosing between processes in the context of any given dispute.185 In the 
private sector, some businesses and industries have developed complex 
hybrid, multi-stage models, beginning with defined and directed 
negotiation, and progressing into increasingly adjudicative and coercive 
mechanisms in later stages if consensual processes fail.186 The goals 
envisioned for legal processes in public disputes have also evolved: 
Nathalie des Rosiers, for example, argues for a therapeutic approach, 
calling upon courts to play an expressive role rather than an adjudicative 
one.187 
It is worth noting that each of these positions, new and old, presup-
poses the existence of effective, competent courts that are ready and able 
to consider claims if called upon to do so. For ethnic conflicts, this is 
often untrue. Indeed, in the ethnic conflict context, there may well be no 
legal processes of any kind to address the dispute at hand.188 Therefore, 
the challenge that we face in considering processes for ethnic conflict is 
not to determine an ideal among the available legal processes, but rather 
to develop any effective legal process at all.  
In this light, while this debate raises many interesting legal process 
issues, I would like to touch on only two: the capacity of legal processes 
to create law, and the risk that legal processes will be used in bad faith or 
to destructive ends.  
If there are both substantive law and formal legal processes to en-
force that law, then adjudicative and consensual models’ processes may 
offer distinctly different advantages: binding versus nonbinding judg-
ments, and an obligation to uphold legally prescribed norms versus an 
ability to expressly compromise those norms, for example. But when 
there is little or no substantive law, and particularly in contexts in which 
enforcement mechanisms are meager, these distinctions begin to col-
lapse.189  
In this context, consensual processes as well as adjudicative ones 
may generate law by establishing practices of participating in those 
processes and adhering to the substantive norms that result. In the Ethio-
pian context, the Berta’s established practice of participating in the 
                                                                                                                      
 185. See Riskin & Westbrook, supra note 180, at 711 (quoting Harry Edwards, Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 668 (1986)); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?, 83 Geo. L.J. 2663 (1995). 
 186. See Riskin & Westbrook, supra note 180, at 747, 753 (quoting Thomas F. 
Stipaniowich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the United States Construction 
Industry, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 65 (1996)).  
 187. See generally des Rosiers, supra note 81. 
 188. Not only this, depending on the issues that are the subject of recurrent ethnic dis-
putes, there may be virtually no substantive law governing ethnic disputes in general.  
 189. This description of the issue presumes the hegemony of substantive law when en-
forcement is effective. That hegemony and its legitimacy are of course far from unchallenged. 
See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983). 
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House of the Federation facilitated their consent to the House’s jurisdic-
tion over their dispute. If this new practice endures and is repeated, the 
jurisdiction of the House over such disputes may eventually become 
obligatory, in that the expectation of participation in the House’s media-
tion process may become as absolute as if that jurisdiction were formally 
mandatory, and the social and political costs of refusing to participate 
may play an enforcement role as effectively as formal sanctions. If the 
Berta case were to reach a substantive result reallocating representatives 
among locally non-indigenous as well as indigenous groups, this result 
itself could also become an institutional norm within the House’s media-
tion process. Thus, because it is a permanent institution with institutional 
memory, the mediation system may in time develop its own customary 
or common law. 
This capacity of various kinds of processes to generate law suggests 
that the most important goal of ethnic-identified states should be to draw 
ethnic groups into ongoing participation in legal processes.190 Legal 
processes will not only become a habit of dispute resolution but also 
may over time themselves generate the law necessary to resolve those 
disputes. Much as states participate in international law, gradually de-
veloping and complying with common norms through iterative processes 
of interpretation, implementation and repudiation that extend far beyond 
traditional legal contexts, so might ethnic groups be drawn into partici-
pation in and creation of domestic legal norms for their behavior by 
participation in legal processes of all sorts.191  
If this is so, then the potential effect of legal processes in controlling 
ethnic conflict transcends the resolution or containment of any particular 
disputes. But if so, then its potential to cause destructive results through 
generation of destructive norms also transcends the risks associated with 
bad faith participation in any given dispute.  
In each model of legal process, the safeguards against destructive 
use of the process can be readily subverted by a bad faith actor. In the 
adjudicative model, formal processes and a neutral judge are intended to 
winnow out false claims and evidence, if not false motives, and to 
                                                                                                                      
 190. Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process offers an interesting insight into 
such processes in the international context. See Koh, supra note 12. While there are of course 
numerous differences between international law and the situation of ethnic groups, there are 
certain key similarities. International actors, like ethnic groups, have shifting identities and 
often face group agency problems. There are enormous gaps in the law governing the relation-
ships and disputes of states in the international arena, just as there are in the relationships and 
disputes of ethnic groups. There are few venues for adjudication of disputes between states, 
and enforcement mechanisms are weak and often come in the form of political sanctions 
rather than legal ones. Finally, the stakes are similarly high; just as unresolved conflicts be-
tween ethnic groups pose a fundamental threat to the multi-ethnic state, so do unresolved 
conflicts between states pose a fundamental threat to world security.  
 191. See id. 
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mitigate power differentials between the parties. But if the judge herself 
is biased, this safeguard fails. Consensual models protect against 
destructive results by their reliance on the agreement of the parties, and 
on the active participation of a third party neutral to address differences 
in power. But if all of the parties are acting in bad faith, they can 
nonetheless hijack the process.192 Finally, if there is not just individual 
but institutional bias, the risk of generating destructive law is acute. If 
the mediation institution develops its own common law by means of the 
practices of the parties, that common law could perpetuate and enforce 
the biases inherent in those collective practices.  
In this respect, having multiple, complementary legal processes is 
not just a matter of maximizing the chance of successful resolution of an 
immediate dispute or providing multiple contexts for participation in 
legal processes and generation of legal norms and compliance. Rather, 
the use of multiple processes centered in multiple institutions helps to 
mitigate this risk of bad faith, and enforcement of constitutional princi-
ples in particular must serve as a vital safeguard against destructive 
norms. Bad faith on one level may be counterbalanced by good faith on 
another; biased norms or practices in one institution ought to be cor-
rected by the norms and practices of another. This possibility creates 
complexities, of course — what if the norms and practices between lev-
els and institutions are truly different? What if, for example, ethnic 
communities consistently vote for recognition as independent Nationali-
ties, and regional states consistently determine that they are ineligible 
according to the constitutional standard? If there are such divergences, 
the development of productive constitutional principles and useful con-
stitutional interpretation will be vital to controlling and limiting them.  
3. Constitutional Interpretation 
The Ethiopian constitution is extreme in its emphasis on ethnic 
group rights. Not only does the constitution provide for virtually un-
qualified rights of self-determination, but it is the “Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples” of Ethiopia who are invoked in the preamble as constitut-
ing the Ethiopian polity, and it is those same Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples in whom sovereignty is said to reside.193  
Other multi-ethnic states do not generally place such constitutional 
weight on their ethnic groups. But ethnic concerns do arise in other con-
stitutional contexts and claims nonetheless. The issue of ethnic identity 
                                                                                                                      
 192. See Carpenter & Kennedy, supra note 10, at 209–210, 216–23 (“If, for example, 
there is serious doubt that some individuals can ever be persuaded to deal fairly with others, 
the [consensual negotiation] program should not go forward, because it may expose partici-
pants to harm if they act in good faith.”). 
 193. See Eth. Const. pmbl., art. 8. 
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that is raised in the Silte case, for example, is often a preliminary ques-
tion in constitutional controversies concerning minority and indigenous 
groups.194  
Beyond questions that can be addressed by reference to existing con-
stitutional rights, however, multi-ethnic states must maintain positive 
inter-ethnic relationships to survive. Constitutional interpretation could 
be a powerful tool for addressing recurrent questions that affect numer-
ous ethnic groups and therefore require authoritative nationwide 
determination, even if those claims are not based in particular rights. For 
example, in the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision regarding Quebec’s 
right to secede unilaterally (the “Quebec Secession case”), discussed 
below, the primary argument made in favor of Quebec’s right to secede 
was not a rights-based claim, as there is no right of secession stated in 
the Canadian constitution. Rather, the court’s decision was founded in 
principles of democracy. And notably, this case was not brought by Que-
bec in an effort to secede, but by the Canadian government in an effort to 
bring the question of Quebec’s status into the legal and constitutional 
arena.195  
The Ethiopian system promotes its Nationalities’ participation in 
constitutional interpretation by placing the power of constitutional inter-
pretation in an ethnic-composed body, providing extensive constitutional 
rights for Nationalities, and granting Nationalities standing to raise 
claims concerning those rights. As discussed above, providing for an 
ethnically representative constitutional body and granting sweeping 
rights to ethnic groups raise numerous constitutional and political con-
cerns. However, ethnic-identified states might well find it productive to 
permit ethnic groups to raise constitutional issues, without otherwise 
altering the state’s current structure for constitutional interpretation.  
What role, then, might constitutional interpretation play in resolving 
ethnic concerns in ethnic-identified states? I see two possibilities: states 
could grant standing to ethnic groups to raise general constitutional 
claims, and courts could actively seek out constitutional values that will 
promote the state’s interest in positive inter-ethnic relationships. Each of 
these approaches would promote ethnic participation in, and therefore 
investment in, the constitutional structure. Each would also promote a 
                                                                                                                      
 194. Such controversies may concern antidiscrimination clauses, rights to language or 
education, or questions of political representation, self-government or secession. See, e.g., 
Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, [2003] S.C.R. 62 (Can.); Case of Gorzelik & Others v. Pol., 
App. No. 44158/98, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. forthcoming (Feb. 17, 2004), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (last viewed Aug. 2, 2003). In ethnic-identified states, ethnic groups 
that function as communities may wish to bring claims that are unrelated to their ethnicity but 
nonetheless require them to be recognized as functional groups, such as constitutional chal-
lenges to national policies or programs that adversely affect their communities. 
 195. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 218 (Can.). 
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mode of ethnic involvement that transcends an opposition of ethnic 
rights and state interests and incorporates shared inter-ethnic and state 
interests. 
a. Constitutional Standing 
Although Ethiopian Nationalities do have standing to request consti-
tutional interpretation on issues relating to their rights, they do not seem 
to have standing to request constitutional interpretation on other is-
sues.196 In addition, ethnic communities that have not been recognized as 
Nationalities for other purposes are also not recognized as having stand-
ing to bring constitutional claims.197 In the Silte case, therefore, it was 
the Southern Nations’ state council, and not the Silte community, that 
referred the constitutional question to the House. 
More broadly, although any litigant in the United States can raise a 
constitutional claim on the same basis as other legal claims, many 
countries sharply limit constitutional standing on the basis of the 
petitioner’s identity. In some systems, only designated government 
entities, such as the executive or the legislature, can request 
constitutional interpretation. In others, the ordinary courts can also refer 
claims that arise in the course of cases to the constitutional court; and in 
more expansive systems, citizens can also petition for enforcement of 
their constitutional rights.198  
Some states currently grant constitutional standing to individual 
members of minority or indigenous ethnic groups to bring claims based 
on minority and indigenous rights. But even when the claims are ones 
that must practically be claimed by more than one person, such as the 
right to schools that will educate students in a minority language, ethnic 
groups can rarely make claims as groups.199 Rather, if ethnic groups can 
make constitutional claims at all, it is generally when they represent the 
rights of their member citizens or can be re-characterized as political 
entities.200  
Ethnic-identified states could take a more inclusive approach to eth-
nic standing and thereby permit ethnic groups to participate in the 
                                                                                                                      
 196. See CCI Proclamation, supra note 22, arts. 21–23 (providing standing only for: any 
person alleging a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms (including Nationality rights); 
courts, to submit constitutional issues that are necessary to decide the case; the parties to a 
court case; and the federal or state executives or one-third of the members of the federal or 
state councils, in cases that are not within the courts’ jurisdiction).  
 197. See CCI Proclamation, supra note 22. 
 198. In Hungary, however, standing is virtually unlimited. Any individual, even a non-
citizen, can raise a constitutional claim. See Ginsburg, supra note 164; Arendt Lijphart, Pat-
terns of Democracy (1999).  
 199. See, e.g., Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, [2003] S.C.R. 62 (Can.). 
 200. See Aukerman, supra note 1, at 1031; Stein, supra note 167, at 53; Wilson, supra 
note 62, at 466–67.  
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process of defining the constitutional structure as it currently exists, 
without granting them new political or social rights. The state could, for 
example, permit ethnic groups to collectively claim general constitu-
tional rights that may not be defined in terms of ethnicity, such as the 
right to use one’s own language or the right to education. It could also 
permit ethnic groups to file requests for constitutional interpretation on 
questions of general interest, irrespective of efforts to enforce rights.201 
Particularly in ethnic-identified states in which ethnic groups represent 
communities, they may have concerns about all aspects of government 
administration and authority, just as individual citizens and other citizen 
groups do. 
As discussed above, the problems of agency and representation that 
are common to group claims could be addressed through one of a variety 
of mechanisms. A state could adopt a set of requirements like those for 
class certification, or could require ethnic groups themselves to gather 
evidence of representation and group consensus in order to bring claims. 
Granting ethnic standing only on a case by case basis might help to pre-
vent ethnic polarization and to ensure authentic representation of a 
community perspective. For these purposes, and for the purpose of en-
couraging consideration of diverse intra-group interests, it might also be 
a positive step to grant standing in appropriate cases to multiple repre-
sentatives with multiple viewpoints from within ethnic groups, rather 
than requiring groups to muster and sustain a single viewpoint in order 
to be heard.202 
Just as providing expressly ethnic mediation institutions may en-
courage ethnic groups to participate in them, so giving ethnic groups an 
interest in the results of constitutional interpretation might encourage 
ethnic groups to use constitutional interpretation to establish their rights 
and obligations vis-à-vis other ethnic groups and the state rather than 
operating outside the constitutional framework.203 This possibility raises 
several questions that deserve further consideration. In theory, it seems 
that granting standing to ethnic groups as groups ought to promote these 
participatory goals better than granting standing only to individual mem-
                                                                                                                      
 201. For a discussion of the issue of participation by and satisfaction of the French mi-
nority in the Quebec secession case, see generally Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Quebec Veto to 
Quebec Secession: The Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada on Quebec-Canada Dis-
putes, 13 Canadian J.L. & Jurisprudence 171 (2000). 
 202. As discussed above, ethnic groups may well re-characterize claims in order to gain 
access to useful systems. Granting standing to intra-group constituencies without requiring 
consensus where consensus does not exist would permit the use of constitutional interpretation 
as a forum for debating and deciding vital issues without pressuring groups to shape their 
claims and interests in ways that do not reflect their true interests. 
 203. More generally, giving ethnic groups a legitimate place in political discussion may 
dissolve their role as opposition groups and thereby encourage internal fracturing and diversi-
fication of political and social views.  
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bers of the group, but is this so in practice? Are there risks associated 
with granting ethnic groups constitutional standing that are different 
from those raised by granting standing to participate in other dispute 
resolution processes? And if so, can those risks be mitigated? 
b. Constitutional Principles 
The possibility of broad ethnic participation in petitions for constitu-
tional interpretation raises another concern: how should ethnic interests 
be weighed in interpreting the constitution? I suggest that courts should 
look beyond dichotomies of ethnic rights and state interests, to constitu-
tional principles that express the genuine interest of the multi-ethnic 
state in maintaining its ethnic diversity, fostering inter-ethnic stability 
and equality, and the like.  
In the Silte case, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry faced a com-
mon interpretative problem: how to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in 
the constitutional text. Although the Ethiopian constitution provides for 
extensive and specific group rights, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
nonetheless found itself without express constitutional direction on the 
questions raised in the Silte case. In justification of its decision to give 
primary authority over the question of ethnic identity to the petitioning 
Silte community itself, the Council culled out and applied an underlying 
constitutional principle of general ethnic self-determination above and 
beyond the specified rights of Nationalities.204  
Other constitutional courts in multi-ethnic states have also struggled 
to articulate effective constitutional principles for determining ethnic 
questions. When asked to decide whether Quebec had the right to secede 
unilaterally from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court found that the 
constitution did not speak directly to the question and looked to unwrit-
ten principles for its decision.205 Similarly, the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina relied on unwritten principles to determine 
whether its entity states could constitutionally define only certain ethnic 
groups as the “constituent peoples” who comprise the polity.206 
                                                                                                                      
 204. See Proposed Decision, Silte case, supra note 129; see also discussion supra Sec-
tion III.A.3. 
 205. See Quebec Secession case, supra note 195. While Canada is a multi-ethnic state, it 
is not one that I would describe as ethnic-identified as defined in the introduction to this Arti-
cle. In addition, Quebec is an excellent example of overlapping group identities: the French 
community in Quebec could be described either as a linguistic group or as an ethnic one. The 
Quebec Secession case thus presents an interesting example of how these issues and identities 
intersect, and demonstrates that even civic-identified states are at times confronted with fun-
damental ethnic questions that can be addressed through constitutional interpretation. 
 206. The court relied in part on the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in the Quebec 
Secession case to justify turning to inherent constitutional principles as a basis for its judg-
ment. It derived from the constitutional preamble the principle of equality among ethnic 
groups and determined that this principle forbade the entity states from defining only their 
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Of course, theories of constitutional interpretation differ sharply on 
the appropriateness of looking beyond the constitutional text at all when 
faced with gaps and ambiguities, and if one should look, where one 
might look, for what kinds of principles, and what use one might make 
of them. An adequate discussion of these questions in the ethnic context, 
while both interesting and relevant, is well beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle.207  
For present purposes, therefore, let us look to constitutional practice. 
The Ethiopian, Canadian, and Bosnian cases suggest that courts in multi-
ethnic states will face ethnic claims that implicate fundamental state 
concerns, up to and including the continued existence of the multi-ethnic 
state. In each of these cases, the court looked for a principled way of 
taking into account the effect its judgment would have on the state’s in-
terests in its inter-ethnic relationships. But in each of these cases, the 
constitutional texts did not provide the courts with an explicit basis for 
articulating those interests. Faced with these gaps and ambiguities, these 
courts turned to underlying constitutional principles. 
In the Silte case, the Council relied solely on rights-based principles. 
This approach, however, can be effective only in those cases in which 
there are rights at stake, but in which there are not conflicting sets of 
rights. Here, the Council considered only the rights of the petitioning 
community, the Silte, and not the rights of the larger community to 
which they then belonged, the Gurage. If the court had taken account of 
Gurage rights of identification and self-determination in addition to the 
Silte’s rights, it would have needed to resort to other principles to deter-
mine the proper balance between those rights in the identification 
process it established.208  
                                                                                                                      
own respective majority ethnic groups as their constituent peoples. See Constituent Peoples 
Decision, supra note 168.  
 207. To say that there is an extensive, rich literature grappling with these problems of 
interpretation is, alas, to devote but a brief wave of the hand to libraries of legal scholarship. 
See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (2d ed. 1986); John Hart Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust (1980). For a history of modern American theories and debate, see 
Kalman, supra note 184. For a discussion of these questions in the context of the Canadian 
and Bosnian cases, see Sujit Choudhry & Robert Howse, Constitutional Theory and the Que-
bec Secession Reference, 13 Canadian J. L. & Jurisprudence 143 (2000); Jean LeClair, 
Canada’s Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles, 27 Queens L.J. 389 (2002); 
Anna Moreweic Mansfield, Ethnic but Equal: The Quest for a New Democratic Order in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1352 (2003). 
 208. See Proposed Decision, Silte case, supra note 129. The Council could, of course, 
have found other, inter-ethnic principles from which to draw. While the Ethiopian constitution 
does not state outright that ethnic stability is a constitutional value, various provisions call for 
promotion of ethnic unity and equality. See Eth. Const. art. 62, § 4 (the House of the Federa-
tion shall promote equality and unity among Nationalities); id. art. 88 (one of the national 
government’s political objectives is to “strengthen ties of equality, unity and fraternity” be-
tween the Nationalities).  
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In the Canadian and Bosnian cases, in contrast, the courts turned to 
constitutional principles that express the interest of the state in its ethnic 
groups, rather than considering only rights-based arguments, or setting 
ethnic and state interests in opposition. As such, they illustrate ways that 
courts could take account of inter-ethnic state interests as a complement 
to rights-based approaches.  
In the Quebec Secession case, the Canadian court turned to underly-
ing constitutional principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism, 
and minority rights to find that Quebec could not secede unilaterally, but 
that the rest of Canada would be obligated to negotiate with Quebec 
concerning its status if Quebec demonstrated a popular consensus in fa-
vor of secession. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the 
national interest in maintaining not just the integrity of the Canadian 
federation, but also its multi-ethnic character. It balanced this national, 
inter-ethnic interest primarily against the democratic legitimacy that 
would be established by a referendum vote in favor of secession. Minor-
ity rights played only a secondary role in the analysis.209  
In the Bosnian case, although the court did not state its decision in 
terms of state interests, it derived and applied a constitutional principle 
of inter-ethnic equality and citizenship from the preamble of the consti-
tution. Relying in part on the decision in the Quebec Secession case, it 
found that these inter-ethnic principles governed the rights established 
for each ethnic group in the state’s ethnic power-sharing arrangement. 
The Republik Srpska and the other sub-entities could not define their 
constituent peoples by ethnicity and thereby exclude other ethnic groups, 
for such exclusions violated the principles of inter-ethnic citizenship and 
equality.210 
Where a state’s constitution makes express acknowledgment of its 
multi-ethnic nature, as the Bosnian constitution does, such provisions 
can serve as a basis for the promotion of inter-ethnic values, such as in-
ter-ethnic stability and equality. But even where it does not, some 
general constitutional values may well be transferable to ethnic contro-
versies. In particular, constitutional courts might apply principles of 
national security and stability, equality and nondiscrimination, and citi-
zenship, to the interest of the multi-ethnic state in maintaining its 
existence and its multi-ethnic character, thereby deriving principles such 
                                                                                                                      
 209. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). Notably, the 
Canadian court also created a process for determining secession in the future rather than 
merely issuing a substantive decision, much as the Ethiopian Council did in the Silte case. Id. 
at 221. 
 210. See Case U 5/98, Request for Evaluation of Constitutionality of Certain Provisions 
of the Constitution of Republika Srpska and the Constitution of the Federation of BiH, Partial 
Decision (Constitutional Ct. Bosn. & Herze. July 1, 2000), available at http://ccbh.ba/ 
decisions (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). 
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as inter-ethnic stability, inter-ethnic equality and fairness, and multi-
ethnic citizenship.211  
These principles would provide a language for expressing the multi-
ethnic state’s interest in inter-ethnic relationships, in the context of any 
group rights regime (or none at all). Rights-based approaches, while 
valuable in establishing constitutional baselines, do set ethnic groups at 
odds and give them incentives to argue for and promote their independ-
ent interests. Consideration of inter-ethnic state values in addition to 
rights requires the constitutional court to promote the overall welfare of 
the state as a whole.212  
Of course, the use of underlying constitutional principles puts in-
credible discretion in the hands of the interpreter.213 There is, therefore, a 
risk that statements of inter-ethnic state concerns could be used to im-
plement ethnic biases. The use of ethnic equality might justify a decision 
to upset the current ethnic arrangements made for any purpose, whereas 
a statement in favor of ethnic stability will tend to favor status quo rela-
tionships even if fundamentally unfair. In addition, while the Canadian 
and Bosnian courts took a purposive approach to constitutional interpre-
tation, a textualist or originalist approach might preclude the extension 
of unwritten constitutional principles into the arena of ethnic conflict.214 
The fact that underlying constitutional principles could serve to address 
                                                                                                                      
 211. Each of these principles has a sturdy constitutional basis outside the context of 
ethnicity. Values of stability, equality, fairness, and citizenship are generally regarded as im-
plicit in the constitutional framework and powers of the state, even when they are not 
explicitly set forth in it. And for the multi-ethnic state, values such as inter-ethnic stability and 
equality are as fundamental as national security and other state interests in orderly govern-
ance, for ethnic conflict poses an undeniably fundamental threat to the multi-ethnic state. The 
court could balance an interest in, for example, inter-ethnic equality with other state and citi-
zen interests in weighing the constitutionality of government policies and proposals. For 
example, when faced with a challenge to a language policy promoting official use of a particu-
lar ethnic group’s language, the court could weigh the state’s need to foster ethnic stability and 
equality in addition to any relevant language and education rights in determining whether the 
policy is constitutional. Ethnic stability and equality could also be used as goals for crafting 
remedies. Considering the language example again, let us assume that the court found that the 
state’s language policy was unconstitutional, and chose to craft a new policy rather than sim-
ply voiding the old one. In doing so, it could take into account what sort of solution would 
promote ethnic stability, such as phasing out the policy gradually, instituting bilingualism, or 
providing alternative support for the ethnic group that is losing the benefit of the policy. Fi-
nally, the state’s interest in its inter-ethnic relationships could be weighed in the context of 
claims that are not primarily ethnic at all. When challenges are brought to environmental 
measures such as building dams, government contracts with foreign companies for develop-
ment or investment, civil service reforms, or any other state policy, the court could consider 
the effect of the proposals on inter-ethnic relations as well as considering the constitutional 
authority of the government and any relevant environmental or property rights.  
 212. In order to persuade the court to rule in its favor, an ethnic group would have an 
incentive to demonstrate that its view not only was in accordance with its rights, but also 
benefited inter-ethnic relations generally.  
 213. See discussion supra note 207. 
 214. Id. 
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ethnic concerns does not mean that they should. But states with funda-
mental inter-ethnic interests and equally fundamental inter-ethnic 
disputes should carefully weigh this approach. 
IV. Conclusion: A Role for Legal Process 
A conflict resolution system could comprise not only legal proc-
esses, but also religious edicts, games of chance, contests, or any other 
accepted method for resolving disputes. Conflict resolution systems can 
be reserved for certain sorts of conflicts, as are bankruptcy courts. They 
can also be limited to certain communities, as are local courts that serve 
only their districts and religious tribunals that serve only believers. How-
ever, conflict resolution systems need not be specialized in either of 
these ways. Many courts are generalists that hear all kinds of cases. The 
process of conflict resolution itself can be as complex as a years-long 
trial with thousands of documents and hundreds of witnesses, or as sim-
ple as flipping a coin.215 
In the world of ethnic conflict, conflict resolution has all too long 
meant use of force. Seeking power and driven by contention, the leaders 
of some multi-ethnic states have used the law as well as politics to di-
vide ethnic groups to their advantage. Afraid to endorse divisive ethnic 
affiliations, many multi-ethnic states have shrunk from giving ethnic 
groups access to legal processes. But for ethnic-identified states, a re-
fusal to acknowledge potent ethnic affiliations may be more likely to 
undermine the legitimacy of the state structures than the legitimacy of 
the ethnic groups. If so, this strategy robs the state of the positive effects 
of legal process demonstrated in other arenas. 
The sort of legal process that will be effective in resolving any given 
ethnic dispute is highly dependent on the nature of the dispute, the par-
ties, and the surrounding circumstances. It is not likely that any one 
process could be identified that would be successful in resolving all eth-
nic disputes, and it is not my aim to prescribe such an approach. Rather, 
what is important is that ethnic-identified states facing recurrent ethnic 
disputes recognize the need for some kind of process, and tailor that 
process to their own ethnic environment.  
However, that does not mean that multi-ethnic states must start from 
scratch every time. The Ethiopian case study offers one approach to this 
problem, and in so doing, raises five fundamental issues that deserve 
further consideration.  
                                                                                                                      
 215. The Goldberg table outlines the primary forms of dispute resolution processes, 
including adjudication, arbitration, mediation, and negotiation, as well as hybrid forms such as 
neutral expert fact-finding and private judging. See Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Media-
tion and Other Processes, supra note 13, at 4–5.  
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(1) Ethnic-identified states facing recurrent ethnic conflicts ought to 
consider opening their legal processes to ethnic groups in some way, 
either by providing special venues or by making the pre-existing judicial 
system accessible to them. Legal processes could provide mechanisms 
for dispute resolution, transform social perceptions of the adjudicability 
of ethnic conflicts, and provide ethnic groups with incentives to shape 
their behavior and claims to be formally cognizable and therefore for-
mally remediable. 
(2) Next, the Ethiopian system relies heavily on the influence of 
constituency on group practices. Constituency is built through participa-
tion in processes and can promote toleration and cooperation through 
self-enforcing incentives for good behavior. For legal processes to suc-
ceed, ethnic groups must have a sense of constituency in the institutions 
that foster them, and legal processes themselves may help to build a 
sense of constituency in the state. Standing could be one method of de-
veloping constituency, and group representation could be another. 
(3) It is also important to develop principles for constitutional inter-
pretation that enable constitutional courts to weigh ethnic interests 
openly. Ethnic groups and their relationships are a vital part of multi-
ethnic states and especially of ethnic-identified states, and many consti-
tutions recognize this, either explicitly or implicitly. Constitutional 
courts could identify and apply relevant constitutional principles, that 
promote the multi-ethnic state’s interest in maintaining its inter-ethnic 
relationships, as well as its desperate need for inter-ethnic peace.  
(4) If ethnic-identified states are to consider adopting legal proc-
esses for ethnic groups, they must also implement safeguards against bad 
faith and misuse. Otherwise, the legal system could be co-opted to ethnic 
rhetoric and ethnic warfare through the very mechanisms that are in-
tended to bring stability. The state will need to establish protections on 
an institutional level to prevent expressly ethnic institutions from be-
coming biased or second class courts. It will also be important to create 
protections within legal processes, so that ethnic affiliations and interre-
lationships can remain dynamic rather than becoming artificially 
entrenched. 
(5) Finally, there is the question of institutional design. The 
Ethiopian system, the world’s history of complex and recurring ethnic 
conflict, and legal process and dispute resolution theory all suggest that 
groups in long-term relationships should anticipate and plan for the 
certainty of conflicts by establishing multi-stage dispute resolution 
processes within an overarching legal framework. Depending on a multi-
ethnic state’s circumstances, resources, and political will, however, a 
state may find that it is better off incorporating ethnic groups into its pre-
existing legal system to some extent, rather than creating an entirely new 
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system for them. Special group or ethnic courts would offer greater 
expertise and ease of access, but would require creation of new 
institutions and would run the risk of creating a second class court 
system with institutional biases.216 
No process can offer a panacea for ethnic conflict. Some disputes are 
too diffuse, others too entrenched for law. But amidst the volatile dy-
namics of ethnic conflicts within ethnic-identified states, there are 
moments at which a legal process could divert at least some conflicts 
from the realm of force into the realm of law. This is a prospect that is 
well worth considering. 
                                                                                                                      
 216. Based on the lessons from the Ethiopian attempt, one possibility for a comprehen-
sive system would be a two-stage process of mediation and adjudication, governed finally by 
constitutional interpretation in a constitutional court or similar institution. The first stage could 
be a consensual mediation process with an institutional mandate to identify ethnic disputes in 
their early stages and intervene quickly before they escalate. This institution should be made 
up of ethnic representatives and should also make use of any relevant ethnic conflict resolu-
tion systems and leadership, in order to build a sense of institutional constituency among 
ethnic groups. If mediation should fail, the next stage would be a binding adjudication proc-
ess. This second stage could take place either in special courts for group conflicts, or in the 
ordinary courts with procedural modifications to permit ease of access for ethnic groups and 
consideration of claims that are not necessarily governed by statutes or codes. Overarching 
constitutional questions should be addressed in a constitutional court without ethnic affilia-
tions, as the concerns of constitutional interpretation are too vital and broad to make ethnic 
constituency a priority in spite of the potential costs to credibility among ethnic groups. The 
constitutional court should, however, develop some mechanism for considering and express-
ing ethnic concerns, such as using principles of inter-ethnic stability and equality, and ethnic 
groups should have standing to bring claims in the constitutional court. 
